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United States v. Burke: The Taxation of
Damages Recovered in Title VII
Discrimination Actions
Introduction
In May 1992, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Burke,' that damages received in settlement of an action
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 must be
included in the recipient's gross income for purposes of calculat-
ing taxable income. 3 This holding resolved an inter-circuit con-
flict, as the District of Columbia Circuit in Sparrow v.
Commissioner,4 had held that damages recovered in a Title VII
discrimination action must be included in income,5 while the
Sixth Circuit in Burke v. United States,6 held that such dam-
ages were not subject to income tax.7
The injuries that result from the kind of discrimination
that Title VII was intended to prevent are generally considered
"tort-type" in nature.8 However, the holding in United States v.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
2. Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace by making it unlawful
to discriminate in hiring, discharge, or promotions on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). See infra notes 153-63
and accompanying text.
3. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
4. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992).
5. Id. at 440.
6. 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
7. Id. at 1123-24.
8. See, e.g., Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) ("An
action based upon the federal antidiscrimination statutes is essentially an action
in tort."); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (holding that injuries result-
ing from violation of federal anti-discrimination statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are "per-




Burke stands in contrast to the general rule that damages re-
ceived in an action based on a tort or tort-type injury are exclud-
able from the recipient's gross income. 9 The majority's decision,
as well as the concurring and dissenting opinions, address but
do not fully resolve two main issues: 1) whether Title VII dam-
ages are of a tort-like nature; and 2) in deciding whether Title
VII damages are tort-like, whether the focus should be on the
type of injury for which the plaintiff brings his cause of action,
or the type of remedy that is available to the plaintiff.10 The
Court's internal disagreement and inconclusive holding" indi-
cate that future Title VII damage recipients may be able to ex-
clude damage awards or settlements from their gross incomes.
This article will address:
I. The section 104(a)(2) exclusion under the Internal Reve-
nue Code and its specific applicability to recoveries for
personal injuries.
II. The purposes and remedies of various federal anti-dis-
crimination statutes, including:
(A) 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(B) 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(C) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(D) The Equal Pay Act
(E) Title VII prior to the 1991 Amendments
(F) Title VII as amended in 1991, and the tax treatment of
recoveries under each of the statutes.
III. The holding of United States v. Burke and its effect on the
tax treatment of Title VII recoveries.
IV. An analysis of the holding of Burke, for claimants under
Title VII as it originally read, and as amended.
V. A conclusion regarding the future applicability of Burke in
light of the 1991 amendments to Title VII.
dissenting) (stating that "[flunctionally, [Title VII] operates in the traditional man-
ner of torts: courts award compensation for invasions of a right to be free from
certain injury in the workplace.").
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1993); see also Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
10. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
11. The majority only addressed the status of recoveries under the un-
amended Title VII. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872 n.8. Title VII was amended in 1991
to provide for jury trials (a traditionally tort procedure) and remedies that are
more tort-like, such as compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1988 & Supp. III 1991), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
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I. The Section 104(a)(2) Exclusion
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that gross income does not include "the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness." 12 Disputes about the meaning of the term "personal
injuries" have been the subject of varying judicial and Treasury
Department interpretations since section 104(a)(2) was en-
acted.13 The term "personal injuries" is subject to very broad
interpretation.1 4 Since 1922, however, the courts and the IRS
have accepted that the term encompasses not only physical in-
juries, but also non-physical injuries, such as damage to reputa-
tion.' 5 In Threlkeld v. Commissioner,'6 a new "personal injury
12. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1993).
13. See, e.g., Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 3
(deciding whether damages for "personal embarrassment" constituted damages for
personal injury that would qualify for § 104(a)(2) exclusion); Roosevelt v. Commis-
sioner, 43 T.C. 77, 77 (1964) (deciding whether amounts received for release of
liability for potential invasion of privacy are excludable under § 104(a)(2)); Sol.
Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920); Sol. Op. 132-I C.B. 92-93 (1922) (deciding inter alia,
whether under the predecessor of § 104(a)(2), alienation of affections could be con-
sidered a personal injury, and whether damages or settlement proceeds received
on account of libel or slander could be excluded); see also infra notes 14-18 and
accompanying text.
Solicitor's Opinions, found in the Internal Revenue Bulletin, are the
equivalent of today's Revenue Rulings. They are not binding legal authority, but
evidence the position the Service takes on a particular issue, given a particular set
of facts. See I- C.B. Table of Contents Page (1922).
Note that the statutory language of § 104(a)(2) was first codified in the Reve-
nue Act of 1918 as § 213(b)(6). The original language read: "[gross income does not
include] [a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under work-
men's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus
the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of
such injuries or sickness." Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1065-66
(1919). For a general, historical discussion of the interpretation of § 104(a)(2) and
§ 213(b)(6), see J. Martin Burke & Michael K Friel, Tax Treatment of Employ-
ment-Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. REV. 13
(1989).
14. The applicability of the term "personal injuries" to physical injuries is
clear on its face. See Burke & Friel, supra note 13, at 13. However, it has also
been expanded to include non-physical injuries such as defamation, Threlkeld v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988); personal
embarrassment and injury to personal reputation, Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
32, 40 (1972), acq. 1972-2 C.B. 3; and injuries arising from discrimination, Curtis
v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974).
15. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (1922). Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
affirmed the position that income was limited to the "gain derived from capital,
3
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test" was enunciated: "[e]xclusion under section 104 will be ap-
propriate if compensatory damages are received on account of
any invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by vir-
tue of being a person in the sight of the law." 7 This test has
never been challenged by the IRS.'8
However, in Treasury Regulation § 1.104-1(c), the IRS pro-
vided official interpretation of the word "damages," as used in
section 104(a)(2). The regulation states, "[t]he term 'damages
received (whether by suit or agreement)' means an amount re-
ceived (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecu-
tion of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights,
or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution." 9 Excludable recoveries are therefore limited to
tort or tort-type claims; a recovery on a contract theory is in-
cludable in the recipient's gross income. 20
from labor, or from both combined." Id. at 207 (citation omitted). However, the
promulgation of Solicitor's Opinion 132, in 1922, expanded the scope of Eisner, and
held that damages recovered for non-physical, but personal injuries should be ex-
cluded from gross income. Burke and Friel, supra note 13 at 16-17. The non-phys-
ical, but personal injuries that Solicitor's Opinion 132 specifically dealt with were
the injuries resulting from alienation of affections, defamation of personal charac-
ter, or the surrendering of custody of a minor child. Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92
(1922).
16. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). Threlkeld involved
the issue of whether damages received in settlement of a suit for malicious prose-
cution were required to be included in the recipient's gross income. Id. at 1297.
Threlkeld asserted in his complaint that the suit caused him to be subjected to
"indignity, humiliation, inconvenience .... pain and distress of mind, . . . [and]
injury to his professional.., and.., credit reputation[s]." Id. at 1295-96. Under a
new test for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, the court found that the damages should
have been excluded. Id. at 1308. Under Tennessee state law, the law of the forum
in which the malicious prosecution action was brought, an action for malicious
prosecution was an action for personal injuries. Id. at 1307.
17. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added). Note that the ability to recover punitive
damages may indicate that the claim protects tort-type rights, but punitive dam-
ages do not qualify for section 104(a)(2) exclusion. See Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (1989); see
infra note 384.
18. See, e.g., Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 659-61 (3d Cir. 1990); Pis-
tillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 148-50 (6th Cir. 1990); Miller v. Commis-
sioner, 93 T.C. 330, 337 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.
1990).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1993).
20. According to the Second Restatement of Contracts, "[tihe traditional goal
of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform
his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach."
1046
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In the absence of clear guidance from the IRS or from the
courts, problems have arisen in deciding if a recovery is includ-
able because of uncertainty as to whether the underlying action
sounds in tort or in contract. Discrimination in the workplace is
one such situation. There is some dispute as to whether a re-
covery for such discrimination is in contract or tort.21 It has
been argued that the nature of a discrimination suit is similar
to any other suit based on a dignitary tort, in which case the
recovery would be a tort-type recovery, and therefore would fall
under the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.22 However, the IRS has
argued that discrimination in the workplace arises from an em-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 16 Introductory Note (1981). Gener-
ally, when there has been a breach of contract, the court will protect the expecta-
tion of the injured party by attempting to put him "in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed, that is, had there been no
breach." Id. § 344 cmt. a. The court may also, as needed, protect the injured party
by compensating him for his reliance on the promise of the breaching party, or
protect the injured party by not allowing the breachor to be unjustly enriched be-
cause of the injured party's actions in reliance on the promise of the breachor. Id.
§ 344 cmts. c, d. Taxable income results from fully performed contracts, therefore
it also results from court-imposed contract remedies.
The law of torts, however, is somewhat different. "While the law of contracts
gives to a party to a contract, as damages for its breach, an amount equal to the
benefit he would have received had the contract been performed, the law of torts
attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as possible
equivalent to his position prior to the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901
cmt. a (1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). It is for this stated purpose that
compensatory damages are awarded. Id. Tort law is also used to determine rights.
Id. § 901(b). Perhaps the biggest distinction from contract law, however, is that
one of the stated purposes of tort law is "to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful
conduct." Id. § 901(c). Punitive damages can be awarded, and can be awarded in
greater or lesser degrees, depending on the culpability of the tortfeasor. Id. § 901
cmt. c. Under contract law, however, "'[w]illful' breaches have not been distin-
guished from other breaches, [and] punitive damages have not been awarded for
breach of contract ... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 16 Introduc-
tory Note (1981).
In certain cases, tort law can also be used to "vindicate parties and deter retal-
iation or violent and unlawful self-help." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 901(d)
(1979). This stated purpose of tort remedies is achieved in certain cases of digni-
tary torts, such as defamation, invasion of privacy, or interference with civil rights.
Id. § 901 cmt. c. Often a major purpose of such a suit is "to obtain a public declara-
tion that the plaintiff is right and was improperly treated." Id.
21. This is the source of much of the controversy among the Justices in United
States v. Burke. See infra notes 266-304 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 147 (6th Cir. 1990) (plain-
tiff claiming that damages recovered in an age discrimination suit based on wrong-
ful termination were a recovery for personal injury, and were therefore
excludable); infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
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ployment arrangement, and therefore, the recovery is a contract
recovery, which does not enjoy the benefit of section 104(a)(2)
exclusion. 23 The IRS has given no formal guidance on the issue;
it has been left to the courts for determination.
II. Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes: Their Purposes,
Remedies, and the Excludability of Their Recoveries
From Gross Income
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
There are several federal statutes that provide remedies for
victims of discrimination. 24 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pro-
vides for the institution of an action at law or at equity for any
deprivation of a person's rights under color of state law. 25 The
purpose of this statute, like that of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is to give
effect to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 26 Sec-
tion 1983 allows for the enforcement of Constitutional guaran-
tees in federal, as well as in state courts, as Congress did not
believe that state courts were vigorously acting to give effect to
Constitutional mandates. 27 Therefore, § 1983 provides for the
23. See, e.g., Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) (Com-
missioner arguing that settlement amount in age discrimination suit was more
akin to recovery for breach of employment contract than to recovery for tort-type
injury); see infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981; infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act; infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Equal Pay Act; infra notes 153-63, 244-53 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Title VII.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The specific language of the statute reads:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Id.
26. Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 n.3 (W.D. Va. 1979), affd,
618 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 942 (1980).
1048
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/6
1994] UNITED STATES v. BURKE 1049
creation of a federal cause of action and remedy to prevent or
deter improper conduct by the states and their officials. 28 It is a
remedy for those who have suffered a Constitutional tort,29 and,
like other federal civil rights statutes, tries to accomplish two
goals: compensation and deterrence.30 Section 1983 provides a
vehicle "to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the
person."31
The remedies permitted under § 1983 are very broad.32 Eq-
uitable remedies such as reinstatement,33 back pay, 34 or injunc-
tions35 are permitted in § 1983 actions. So too are legal
remedies, such as compensatory 6 and punitive damages.37 In
fact, nominal and punitive damages are permitted even if the
plaintiff has suffered no actual harm.38
Generally, recovery under § 1983 has been found to be com-
pensation for personal injuries, and therefore excludable from
gross income under Internal Revenue Code section 104(a)(2).
For example, in Wilson v. Garcia,39 the Supreme Court held
28. Roberts v. Rowe, 89 F.R.D. 398, 401 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
29. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. City of Evanston,
411 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "constitutional tort" as, essentially, a violation of
the command of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
30. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53 (1984).
31. Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1969).
32. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that fed-
eral courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973).
33. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 594 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir.
1979).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Thrasher v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 534 F. Supp. 103,
105 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (actions awarding injunctive relief under § 1983 are permissi-
ble even where the costs of the relief must be borne by the state), affd, 691 F.2d
504 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 364 A.2d 1080, 1097
(N.J. 1976) (holding that compensatory damages could be recovered, even in ab-
sence of showing of actual pecuniary loss); Ruhlman v. Hankinson, 461 F. Supp.
145, 151 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (stating that compensatory damages for emotional dis-
tress could be recovered in civil rights action), affd, 605 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
37. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 268-69
(1981); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.
1978).
38. Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
39. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
7
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that a claim brought under the auspices of § 1983 was a claim
for personal injuries. 40 The issue before the Court was the ap-
propriate state statute of limitations in an action based on an
unlawful arrest.41 Since there was no federally prescribed stat-
ute of limitations for § 1983 actions, the Court utilized the "set-
tled practice ... [of] adopt[ing] a local time limitation as federal
law if ... not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so."42
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and found that the appropriate statute of
limitations was three years, a state of New Mexico limitation of
action on "an injury to the person or reputation of any person."43
The Court found this statute of limitations most appropriate be-
cause § 1983 actions are based on personal injuries." In fact,
the Court specifically stated that all § 1983 actions "are best
characterized as personal injury actions . .. .45
Similarly, in Bent v. Commissioner,46 despite the conten-
tions of the Commissioner that the recovery by an improperly
40. Id. at 278 (citing Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972)). "In
the broad sense, every cause of action under § 1983 which is well-founded results
from 'personal injuries.'" Almond, 459 F.2d at 204.
41. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 262-63. The plaintiff in Wilson sued a New Mexico
State Police officer and the New Mexico State Police Chief, alleging a violation of
§ 1983, after the officer had unlawfully arrested the plaintiff, beat him, and
sprayed him with tear gas. Id. at 263. The Chief of Police was named in the suit
because of allegations of deficient training of the officer, and an alleged failure to
intervene to stop the officer's known "violent propensities." Id. (quoting Appel-
lant's Brief at 6-7).
The plaintiff filed his claim two years and nine months after the alleged inci-
dent occurred. Id. Section 41-4-15(A) of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act provided:
"Actions against a governmental entity or a public employee for torts shall be for-
ever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years after the date of
occurrence resulting in loss, injury or death." Id. at 263 n.2 (quoting N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978)). However, § 37-1-8 provided: "Actions... for an injury to
the person or reputation of any person [must be brought] within three years." Id.
at 264 n.4 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978)). And, § 37-1-4 provided: "[A]ll
other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified [must be brought]
within four years." Id. at 264 n.5 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978)).
Under § 41-4-15(A), plaintiffs claim would have been barred, although it would
not have been barred under either of the other two sections.
42. Id. at 266-67.
43. Id. at 280 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978)).
44. Id. at 278-80. "Had the 42d Congress expressly focused on the issue de-
cided today, we believe that it would have characterized § 1983 as conferring a
general remedy for injuries to personal rights." Id. at 278.
45. Id. at 280.
46. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
1050
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dismissed high school teacher was in the nature of wages,47 the
Tax Court decided that violations of § 1983 were intended to
create tort liability rather than contractual liability.48 There-
fore, the § 1983 claims were in the nature of personal injury
claims and eligible for the benefit of the section 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion.49 The court also stated that the consideration of lost
wages in establishing a recovery did not make the claim a con-
tract claim, but rather was an evidentiary factor in determining
the amount of the recovery.50
In Wulf v. City of Wichita,51 the court held that even if a
recovery under § 1983 is for back pay, it will be found non-taxa-
ble because the nature of the underlying claim is tort-type. 52 In
Wulf, the court was evaluating the award made by the federal
district court to a former police lieutenant who had been wrong-
fully terminated in violation of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.5 3 On appeal, the defendants challenged a
"tax enhancement figure" that the district court had imposed, in
the mistaken belief that the award would be taxable because it
47. Id. at 243. The Commissioner claimed that the settlement payment re-
ceived by Bent constituted the difference in wages he would have received had he
not been wrongfully terminated, and the amount he actually received. Id.
Although the settlement agreement did not allocate any part of the settlement to
wages or damages, the parties agreed that the consideration of damages should
include wage differential, commuting differential, differential in benefits, attor-
neys' fees, and a nominal amount for physicians' bills and medications. Id. at 241-
42.
48. Id. at 246-49.
49. Id. at 248-49.
50. Id. at 251. "[C]onsideration of a taxpayer's lost wages is appropriate in
disposing of a sec. 1983 claim for redress of injuries resulting from violations of the
First Amendment, as well as in disposing of an employment contract claim." Id. at
250.
51. 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989).
52. Id. at 873.
53. Id. at 846. Wulf was president of the Fraternal Order of Police, a lodge
whose members were also members of the Wichita City police force. Id. at 847.
The lodge had come under fire for having a raucous party, at which Wulf was not
present. Id. Resignations of several of the lodge officers, from their positions as
officers of the lodge, had been suggested by the chief of the police force. Id. Upon
refusing to resign, Wulf was given, in effect, a professional demotion. Id. at 848.
Believing this demotion unwarranted, he drafted a letter to the Attorney General,
indicating serious misconduct on the part of the Wichita police force. Id. at 850.
Wulf was dismissed after the letter had appeared in the local newspaper, and the
chief of police called for an internal investigation about the letter, at which investi-
gation Wulf refused to discuss the matter without the presence of an attorney. Id.
at 852-53.
9
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was back pay. 54 The court stated that "[t]he award of backpay
[sic] compensated him for the economic injury resulting from
the denial of his Constitutional rights."55 Further, the court
found that even though it was an award of back pay, it was still
an award of damages "on account of personal injuries," and was
not taxable.56 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the dis-
trict court's award to the extent that it contained a figure that
increased the award to compensate for the taxes for which it
believed Wulf was liable.57
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Federal anti-discrimination statute 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was
enacted to effectuate the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.58 It provides that all persons, regardless of race, should
have the same benefits under the law, to "make and enforce
contracts, to sue, to be parties, give evidence" and to enjoy the
protections of the law over their persons and their property.59
Section 1981 protects against discrimination by non-govern-
mental entities, as well as against discrimination under color of
state law.60
Section 1981 proscribes discrimination in the work-
place 61 and has been held to extend beyond the right to con-
54. Id. at 871.
55. Id. at 873.
56. Id. (quoting Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1987)).
57. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 873.
58. Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Ill.
1936). Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991). The statute provides: "All persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other." Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (Supp. III 1991).
61. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that § 1981
and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit any discrimination in employment based
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tract.62 In fact, § 1981 has been held to be "in the nature of a
tort remedy."6 3 As such, its remedies are not limited to those
that are equitable, 64 but can include compensatory and punitive
damages. 65
Suits brought under § 1981 have also been characterized as
suits for personal injury. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,66
plaintiffs claimed that their employer and their union had dis-
criminated against them on the basis of race, and brought an
action alleging violations of § 1981.67 Since § 1981 does not
have its own statute of limitations, the district court was re-
62. Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1028 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 904 (1978). The Third Circuit stated that:
[t]o read the language of the statute as applying only to the right to contract
ignores the clear and vital words of the majority of its provisions. Despite
the sparsity of precedent, a natural and commonsense reading of the statute
compels the conclusion that section 1981 has broad applicability beyond the
mere right to contract.
Id.
63. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986) (cit-
ing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1985), affd, 482
U.S. 656 (1987)), affd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). Goodman states that § 1981 is based
on the Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids slavery. Goodman, 777 F.2d at 119.
Therefore, the Goodman court found it "difficult to imagine a more fundamental
injury to the individual rights of the person than the evil that comes within the
scope of that amendment." Id. The court then noted that the Supreme Court ap-
proved state personal injury statutes of limitations for § 1981 cases. Id.
64. See Collier v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 441 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (holding that plaintiff entitled to equitable, as well as legal relief upon estab-
lishing a cause of action under § 1981); Wade v. Mississippi Co-op Extension Serv.,
424 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (finding that defendants were subject to
back pay liability under § 1981, unless Eleventh Amendment precluded such
relief).
65. Collier stated that "[a]n individual who establishes a cause of action under
section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory
and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages." 441 F. Supp. at 1213 (quot-
ing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975)). See also Easley v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 263 (8th Cir. 1985) (compensatory damages
available under § 1981); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788, 554 F.2d
876, 883 (8th Cir.) (punitive damages available under § 1981), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 891 (1977). Compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable only in tort
actions. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
66. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
67. Id. at 658-59. Plaintiffs' claims against the union included charges that
the union did not diligently prosecute wrongful discharges of certain members,
that the union did not assert challenges against employers made on the basis of
discrimination, and that the union was a passive supporter of the employer's dis-
criminatory practices. Id. at 659-60
11
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quired to use an analogous state statute of limitations. 68 The
district court found the most appropriate statute of limitations
to be the six year period for contract, trespass, and replevin ac-
tions. 69 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court, and found that the appropriate state statute of limita-
tions was one applicable to personal injury actions. 70
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Cir-
cuit, finding that the appropriate state statute of limitations for
a § 1981 action was the statute applicable to personal injury ac-
tions. 71 The Court noted that "[s]ection 1981 has a much
broader focus than contractual rights. The section speaks not
only of personal rights to contract, but personal rights to sue, to
testify, and to equal rights under all laws for the security of per-
sons and property .. "72 While § 1981 deals with the right to
contract, its purpose is to prohibit discrimination in the contrac-
tual process on the basis of race. 73 Therefore, because § 1981 is
part of an anti-discrimination scheme, the Supreme Court
found that it involved "fundamental injur[ies] to the individual
rights of [people]." 74
There are no existing cases which explicitly state that all
§ 1981 recoveries are excludable from income. However, in
Johnson-Waters v. Commissioner,75 the Tax Court noted in its
decision a concession made by the government that at least part
of the taxpayer's settlement recovery was excludable under sec-
tion 104(a)(2), because it constituted a recovery for a tort-type
injury pursuant to § 1981.76 The court noted the apparent cor-
rectness of the government's concession in a footnote, stating
68. Id. at 660.
69. Id. at 659.
70. Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 662.
72. Id. at 661.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1693 (1993).
76. Id. at 1695. The taxpayer's original action alleged violations of § 1981,
§ 1988, and Title VII, based on the denial of a promotion. She sought relief in the
form of "lost wages, lost benefits, lost retirement, [and] lost future wages in the
event that reinstatement was not ordered. . . ." Id. at 1694.
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that pursuant to Goodman, actions brought under § 1981 "could
address tort-type injuries."77
C. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) forbids
discrimination by employers in the hiring, discharge, or com-
pensation of employees on the basis of age.78 There are,
however, exceptions if age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion,7 9 or if the company is operating in a foreign land whose
laws would be violated if persons over a certain age were per-
mitted to work.80 An employer may not correct discriminatory
practices by reducing the wages of employees who were not sub-
ject to the discrimination in order to equalize wage
differentials.8 1
Congress's stated purpose for the enactment of the Act is to
"promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than [their] age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
77. Id. at 1695 n.2 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)).
The Supreme Court in Goodman noted the similarity of the characterization of
§ 1981 injuries to the characterization of § 1983 injuries in Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261 (1985). Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661. Based on this holding from Goodman,
claims under § 1981 are analogous to "personal injury" claims under § 1983, as
characterized by Wilson. In Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 853, afd, 845
F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988), it was held that pursuant to Goodman, violation of the
command of § 1983 was the equivalent of an injury to the individual rights of a
person. Metzger held the same analysis was applicable to § 1981 actions. Id.; see
infra notes 165-78 for a complete discussion of Metzger. Once it has been estab-
lished that there has been a recovery for "personal injuries" in a suit prosecuted for
injury to "tort or tort-type" rights, or to legal rights that are "more analogous to a
tort-type right than to any other legal category of rights," the recovery should be
excludable under § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. Since § 1983 recov-
eries are recoveries for personal injuries and excludable, Bent v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 236, 248 (1986), af'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987), so too should be recoveries
under § 1981.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1988). This statute makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer to: "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrim-
inate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
79. A bona fide occupational qualification is a qualification of an employee
that is reasonably necessary for the normal and efficient operation of a business.
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988); see, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697
F.2d 743 (7th Cir.) (deciding whether being younger than age 55 constituted a bona
fide occupational qualification for firemen in the city of Wauwatosa, Wisconsin),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1988).
81. Id. § 623(a)(3).
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in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employ-
ment."8 2 Case law subsequent to its enactment has specifically
held that the purpose for its enactment, as well as the enact-
ment of Title VII, is to eliminate discrimination in the
workplace.83
Enforcement provisions allow for the recovery of back pay,
and for recovery of liquidated damages equal to the amount of
back pay due, provided the violation of the Act was willful.
84
There is also a broad provision that allows an aggrieved party to
bring a civil action "for such legal or equitable relief as will ef-
fectuate the purposes of ... [the Act]." 85
The issue of whether recovery under the ADEA could be ex-
cluded from gross income pursuant to section 104(a)(2) was ad-
dressed in Rickel v. Commissioner.8 6 In this case, the plaintiff,
although qualified, was not awarded the position of president of
the company for which he was working.8 7 The new president,
who was twenty years younger than plaintiff, terminated plain-
tiff because of the desire to have someone younger assume
plaintiffs position in the company.88
Plaintiff brought suit under the ADEA, but the case was
subsequently settled for an $80,000 lump sum plus $25,000 in
each of the succeeding four years.8 9 Plaintiff did not include any
82. Id. § 621(b).
83. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The Court also noted that the
substantive provisions of the two statutes were identical, as "the prohibitions of
the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The section provides that
"[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for pur-
poses of [section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act]: [pirovided, [t]hat liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter." Id.
Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b),
provides, in part, that any violating employer "shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988).
86. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 656.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 656-57. The settlement agreement did not specify how much of the
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of these amounts in his gross income. The IRS determined
there was a deficiency against him for the tax on $105,000,
which was not included in his income for 1983 and 1984.90 The
Tax Court held that one-half of the recovery was includable,
and one-half was excludable pursuant to section 104(a)(2). 91
The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court in part, and held that
the entire amount of the recovery was excludable. 92
In its decision to reverse in part, the Third Circuit applied
the test for personal injury from Threlkeld v. Commissioner.93
The court determined that age discrimination was more analo-
gous to a personal injury tort claim than to a contract claim. 94
The court stated:
we do not believe that the ADEA and federal employment dis-
crimination statutes in general, are usefully viewed as a Congres-
sional attempt to rewrite the terms of employment contracts....
[N]othing in the statutes suggests or hints at such an inten-
tion .... But more importantly the scope of these statutes goes
beyond the mere employer-employee context, protecting individu-
als from various forms of discrimination even if they are not yet in
a contractual relationship, e.g., refusal to hire contexts. 95
The court also relied on a long history of case law as support for
the proposition that discrimination in the workplace is a per-
sonal injury.96 Finally, the court dismissed the argument that
90. Id. at 657. The Commissioner claimed that this amount represented
either back pay or punitive damages, neither of which were excludable from gross
income. Id.
91. Id. The Tax court utilized this reasoning because plaintiff's claims were
one half for back pay, and one half for liquidated damages. Id. at 661. The back
pay award was to be treated as damages in lieu of wages, which was in the nature
of a contract recovery, and the liquidated damages were to be treated as compensa-
tion for a tort or tort-type injury. Id.
92. Id. at 667.
93. Id. at 658-63; see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
94. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 662-63. The Rickel court relied for this proposition on
the characterization of another federal anti-discrimination statute in Byrne v.
Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989). The Byrne court stated that a discrim-
ination suit "alleges the violation of a duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant
employer which arises by operation of the [Fair Labor Standards] Act. This duty is
independent of any duty an employer might owe his employee pursuant to an ex-
press or implied employment contract; it arises by operation of law." Rickel, 900
F.2d at 662 (quoting Byrne, 883 F.2d at 215).
95. Id. at 662.
96. Id. at 662-63. Some of the cases the court cited to support its proposition
were: Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987) (holding that § 1981
1994] 1057
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the plaintiff was receiving better tax treatment than he would
have received had he not been subjected to discrimination in the
first place.97 The court also found no justification for treating
victims of personal injury differently, depending on whether the
personal injury arose from a physical or from a non-physical
injury. 98
A similar situation arose in Pistillo v. Commissioner.99
Plaintiff had been subject to frequent disparaging remarks dur-
ing the course of his employment with Cleveland Tool and Sup-
ply Company. 100 He was eventually discharged and replaced by
a younger employee, and remained unemployed for the duration
of his suit.10 1 Pistillo sued Cleveland Tool, seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief, back pay, and attorney's fees. 10 2 A jury
found in his favor, but Cleveland Tool appealed. 10 3 Pending the
appeal of the case, the parties reached a settlement. 10 4 Pistillo
did not include the settlement amount in his income, based on
section 104(a)(2), and the Commissioner subsequently issued a
notice of deficiency. 10 5 Although the Tax Court held that the
bars racial discrimination, which is "a fundamental injury to the individual rights
of a person"); Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1979) ("An
action based upon the federal antidiscrimination statutes is essentially an action
in tort."); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1143
(4th Cir. 1975) ("an action brought under statutes forbidding racial discrimination
is fundamentally for the redress of a tort"). Id.
97. Id. at 664.
98. Id. The court also noted that it was merely complying with Treasury Reg-
ulation 1.104-1(c), which was responsible for interjecting tort and contract consid-
eration into the § 104(a)(2) excludability analysis. Id.
99. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 146. Pistillo had been referred to as "old" and having "gray hair" in
a disparaging manner. He was also told that he was "unable to relate to his
younger clients." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 146-47. He specifically requested an order:
1) declaring that Cleveland Tool had discriminated against him on the basis
of his age; 2) granting him a preliminary and permanent injunction en-
joining Cleveland Tool from abridging his rights; 3) requiring Cleveland
Tool to reinstate him to the position he had held on April 6, 1979, and to pay
him all wages, including overtime, that he would have received in the nor-
mal course of his employment... ; and 4) granting him reasonable attorneys
[sic] fees.
Id.
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amount should have been included in his gross income, the
Sixth Circuit reversed. 10 6
Relying on Rickel v. Commissioner,07 the court determined
that Pistillo's claim under the ADEA was analogous to the as-
sertion of a tort-type right to redress personal injuries. 08 The
court stated that "whether Cleveland Tool paid Pistillo a por-
tion of the settlement award to compensate him for pain and
suffering or lost back pay [was] irrelevant to the § 104(a)(2) in-
quiry."0 9 The court also stated that Pistillo's lost wages, even
though a non-personal consequence, were still the result of a
personal injury. 10 Finally, as in Rickel, the court dismissed the
argument that allowing excludability would put the plaintiff in
a better position than if there had been no discrimination."'
The court reasoned:
[just as the common law punishes tort-feasors, the ADEA pun-
ishes employers who practice age discrimination .... To effectu-
ate the purposes of both the ADEA and the [Internal Revenue
Code], we must make the victims of arbitrary age discrimination
whole by providing equal recognition to the substantial indigni-
ties and personal injuries they have suffered. 112
The court thus concluded that Pistillo's recovery was excludable
under the provisions of section 104(a)(2). 113
The Tax Court agreed with excludability for an ADEA re-
covery in Downey v. Commissioner."4 The taxpayer, a former
pilot for United Airlines, was forced to retire at age sixty, de-
spite a Federal Aviation Administration Rule that would have
permitted him to continue working on the flight crew, although
not as a pilot." 5 The taxpayer stood to lose nearly $90,000 of
106. Id. at 150-51.
107. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
108. Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 149. The court applied the Threlkeld test, and found
that age discrimination invaded the rights that Pistillo was granted by being a
person in the eyes of the law. Id. at 149-50.
109. Id. at 150 n.6.




114. 97 T.C. 150, 173 (1991), affd on motion for reconsideration, 1992-93 T.C.
Rep. (RIA) 336 (1993).
115. Downey, 97 T.C. Rep. at 153-54. The FAA rule, also known as "the age




accrued sick leave if forced into retirement. 116 Thus, he sued
under the ADEA, seeking, inter alia, reinstatement, back pay
with interest and liquidated damages. 117
The case was eventually settled for $120,000, one-half of
which was allocated to liquidated damages, and one-half of
which was allocated to non-liquidated damages."18 The tax-
payer then included on his 1985 federal income tax return only
the $60,000 attributable to the non-liquidated portion of the set-
tlement. 119 The government determined that all $120,000
should have been included in the taxpayer's income. 120
The Tax Court first determined whether the taxpayer's
claim under the ADEA sounded in tort, and then, whether the
injury that he had suffered as a result of the age discrimination
was personal.' 2' Citing Pistillo v. Commissioner, 22 the court
stated that claims under the ADEA are "in the nature of tort or
tort-type claims." 23 Further, the court found that "invidious
discrimination, including age discrimination, is a personal in-
jury for purposes of section 104(a)(2)." 24 After making these
two critical determinations, the court found that the entire set-
tlement amount, $120,000, was excludable from the taxpayer's
gross income. 125 In fact the court went on to overrule its prior
decisions that "backpay [sic] or nonliquidated damages based on
backpay [sic]" received pursuant to a claim under the ADEA
were not excludable under section 104(a)(2).126 The court stated
or first officers. However, the FAA rule would permit such persons to serve on
flight crews as second officers. Id. at 153.
116. Id. at 154.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 155. The agreement further provided that the non-liquidated
amount would be "subject to all tax withholdings and deductions as required by
law." Id.
119. Id. at 156.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 164.
122. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
123. Downey, 97 T.C. Rep. at 165.
124. Id. (citing Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (6th Cir.
1991)); see infra notes 180-210 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
Burke's disposition by the district court and by the Sixth Circuit.
125. Downey, 97 T.C. Rep. at 165.
126. Id. at 168-69. The Tax Court was overruling its own decisions in both
Rickel and Pistillo in order to make its rulings "more consistent with [its] decisions
in Metzger... and Threlkeld .... "Id. at 168; see infra notes 165-78 and accompa-
nying text for a complete discussion of Metzger.
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that United's liability to the taxpayer arose not because of the
breach of a contractual obligation, but because of the breach of
the anti-discrimination mandate of the ADEA. 127 Finally, the
court concluded that even the liquidated damages portion of a
recovery under the ADEA would be excludable. 128
Upon motion by the government, the case was reheard in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Burke.129 However, the decision in favor of the taxpayer was
affirmed. 30
127. Downey, 97 T.C. at 169.
128. Id. at 170. The government had argued that the liquidated damages por-
tion of the recovery was equivalent to punitive damages, and was therefore not
excludable under § 104(a)(2). Id. The court stated, however, that the liquidated
damages allowable under the ADEA "are intended to compensate the victim of age
discrimination for certain nonpecuniary losses and, thus, are excludable from
gross income under section 104(a)(2)." Id. The court made this finding despite the
holding of the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111 (1985), that the "ADEA's legislative history 'indicates that Congress intended
for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.'" Downey, 97 T.C. at 171 (quoting
Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125). The Downey court did not "believe the Supreme Court
[in Thurston] to have concluded that, from the recipient's perspective, receipt of
liquidated damages under the ADEA represents anything other than compensa-
tion from those losses that are hard to calculate." Id.
129. Downey v. Commissioner, 1992-93 T.C. Rep. (RIA) 336, 336 (1993); see
infra notes 258-304 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of United
States v. Burke.
130. Id. at 338. The court distinguished Title VII because of the wider range
of remedies available to ADEA claimants, which are not available to Title VII
claimants, including the availability of "both unpaid wages and 'liquidated dam-
ages.'" Id. The court noted that the liquidated damages provision in the ADEA
served both compensatory and punitive functions, indicating that a claim under
the ADEA was tort-like in nature. Id. The court thus found that discrimination
under the ADEA constituted a tort-like personal injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2),
and therefore, its prior decision was correct in holding all of the taxpayer's recov-
ery excludable from gross income. Id.
The court's decision was not unanimous, however. Judge Cohen, who dis-
sented in Downey I, agreed with the result, as the majority addressed only the
status of the liquidated damages portion of the recovery. Id. (Cohen, J., concur-
ring). However, Judge Cohen believed that the majority in Downey II was going
too far in its construction of Burke. He stated that nothing in the Burke opinion
indicated that adding a liquidated damages component to a back pay award would
make the sum excludable in toto. Id.
Judge Halpern, who wrote the majority opinion in Downey I, also concurred in
the result of Downey II, agreeing that the remedies available to the taxpayer in
Downey were "sufficiently broad to render his injury 'tort-like,' as that term is used
in Burke," because the liquidated damages served to compensate the taxpayer for
the non-pecuniary losses that he suffered, and to deter future discriminatory con-
duct. Id. at 339 (Halpern, J., concurring). Judge Halpern disagreed with the hold-
19
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D. Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act, also known as section 206(d) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, prohibits sexual discrimination in the
workplace by imposing sanctions for the payment of disparate
wages on the basis of sex. 131 There is an exception to the provi-
sion if the wage differential is based on a legitimate seniority or
merit system, or on legitimate differences in quality or quantity
of work, or on any factor other than sex. 132 The employer is not
permitted to equalize the disparity in wages by reducing the
wages of the more lucratively compensated employee or employ-
ees. 33 Violations of the Equal Pay Act are deemed to result in
damages recoverable in the form of unpaid wages. 34
ing of the majority in Downey II to the extent that the majority believed that
discrimination under the ADEA was, in all instances, a tort-like personal injury.
Id. Halpern noted that liquidated damages were available only in cases of willful
violations of Title VII, and that if a violation was not willful, the claimant was
limited to back pay relief, which was found insufficient in Burke to justify exclu-
sion under § 104(a)(2). Id.
Judge Laro concurred in part and dissented in part because he believed that
while the liquidated damages portion of the recovery constituted a recovery for a
tort or tort-like injury, any amount that represented the non-liquidated damages
portion was properly considered a contractual recovery and not excludable under
§ 104(a)(2) and Burke. Id. at 343 (Laro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He felt that recoveries should be bifurcated into tort recoveries and contrac-
tual recoveries, the former being excludable and the latter not. Id. at 342. An
action seeking back pay, and arising out of an employment agreement, was essen-
tially a contract action, according to Judge Laro. Id. Thus, in cases where there
was a non-willful violation of the ADEA, and the claimant was limited to back pay
in his recovery, Laro felt that as in Burke, the back pay recovery was in the nature
of a contract recovery, and should be included in the claimant's gross income. Id.
at 343-44.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). The statute forbids discrimination by an
employer:
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees.., at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite
sex.., for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,





134. Id. § 206(d)(3). The language of subsection (d)(3) specifically provides
that "[for purposes of administration and enforcement, any amounts owing to any
employee which have been withheld in violation of this subsection shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this chap-
ter." Id.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/6
1994] UNITED STATES v. BURKE 1063
Cases interpreting the Equal Pay Act have stated that its
intended purpose is to correct discriminatory wage practices
and eliminate sexual discrimination in the workplace. 135 Sev-
eral of these cases state that providing equal pay for equal work
serves the Congressional purpose of correcting the social and
economic consequences of disparate wages, including the stere-
otypical misconceptions of the value of a woman's work. 136
To achieve its purposes, the Equal Pay Act permits victims
of sexual discrimination to recover back pay. 137 As an addi-
tional measure, the Equal Pay Act has a liquidated damages
provision, where an employee can recover an additional sum
equal to his or her back pay if the employee can prove the em-
ployer violated the statute. 138 There is no requirement of show-
ing additional harm to the employee. However, the trial judge
has the option of disposing of the liquidated damages if he finds
that the employer reasonably believed he was in compliance
with the Act.139
The issue of the excludability from gross income of a recov-
ery under the Equal Pay Act was addressed in Thompson v.
135. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 102, 104 (M.D.
Pa. 1971); Shultz v. American Can Co., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970).
136. Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648, 656
(5th Cir. 1969). Congress's purpose can be gleaned from a statement by Represen-
tative Donahue during the legislative debate surrounding the enactment of the
Equal Pay Act:
We all realize that the origin of the wage rate differential for men and wo-
men performing comparable jobs is the false concept that a woman, because
of her very nature, somehow or other should not be given as much money as
a man for similar work. This antiquated concept has been long and com-
pletely demonstrated to be false and it is indefensible from every stand-
point. This being so, we may wonder why this legislation is necessary. ...
The answer is... that discrimination in wage payments, on the basis of sex
alone, continues to exist....
Shultz, 420 F.2d at 656 (quoting CONG. REC. 9,212 (1965) (statement of Rep.
Donahue)).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
138. Id. § 216(b). The section provides, in part, that "[any employer who vio-
lates ... [§ 206 or § 207 of this Equal Pay Act] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid
overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 260.
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Commissioner.140 The plaintiff was a member of a class who
had filed a sexual discrimination suit against its employer
based on unequal pay for equal work.' 4 ' Her share of the recov-
ery was $66,795.19 for back pay under the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII, and a like amount for liquidated damages under the
Equal Pay Act. 42 She included the back pay award in income,
but not the liquidated damages amount. 43 The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency for the liquidated damages amount, and
the plaintiff subsequently petitioned for a refund of the tax paid
on the back pay award.'4
The Tax Court determined that the back pay portion of the
award was properly included in income, but the liquidated dam-
ages portion should have been excluded. 145 The Fourth Circuit
subsequently affirmed. 146 The Tax Court properly concluded
that "back pay ... received under the Equal Pay Act is not in
the nature of damages for a tort or tort-type right," but rather is
more in the nature of a payment for a contract violation. 4 The
Tax Court asked the question, "in lieu of what were the dam-
140. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), affd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 633. Plaintiff was an employee of the Government Printing Office,
and as a member of the class action suit, alleged that the office employed no wo-
men in management positions in the production department, and that few women
were employed as "craftsmen," for which they would have received substantially
higher wages than they would have received as "non-craftsmen." The class also
alleged that much of the work performed by non-craftsmen was the same as work
performed by craftsmen. Id. at 634-35.
142. Id. at 637.
143. Id. at 641.
144. Id. at 642. Plaintiff based her claim to the refund on the Tax Court's
holding in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988). Under Threlkeld, exclusion is appropriate under § 104(a)(2) when
there is an "invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of being a
person in the sight of the law." Id. at 1308. See supra notes 16-17 and accompany-
ing text. The plaintiff in Thompson claimed that the amount she received was on
account of personal injuries. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 643.
145. Id. at 648-50.
146. Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712.
147. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 646. The Tax Court reasoned that:
[the claim which was allowed was for back pay because the work petitioner
had done warranted that pay.... [Tihere is nothing in Threlkeld v. Commis-
sioner that converts a claim for back pay, because an individual has been
underpaid for the work he has done, into a claim for damages for a personal
injury merely because the suit which involves such a claim may also have
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ages awarded," and stated that if the answer was "wages," then
the amount could not be excluded under section 104(a)(2). 148
With respect to the liquidated damages award, the Tax Court
made the inquiry whether it was compensation for personal in-
jury or whether it was part of the back pay award. 149 The fact
that the recovery was measured by the amount of back pay due
to plaintiff was not the controlling factor. 50 Rather, the fact
that the liquidated damages were paid on account of sexual dis-
crimination that was not in good faith' 5' was the factor that
weighed in favor of excluding them from income under section
104(a)(2). 152
E. Title VII, Prior to the 1991 Amendments
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is targeted specifi-
cally at discrimination in the employment context. 153 Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring,
discharge, or promotions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 54 A Title VII violation can be based on dis-
parate impact, 55 or by a showing that an individual's personal
148. Id. at 647 (quoting Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982), affd, 749
F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984)).
149. Id. at 649. The court stated that if the liquidated damages had been
awarded under Title VII, instead of the Equal Pay Act, then the amounts would
have been damages for personal injury, and thus excludable. Id. at 648.
150. Id. at 649. The court relied on Threlkeld for the proposition that the
amount of income lost is an accurate measure of plaintiffs injury. Id.
151. Good faith sexual discrimination may occur where gender is a bona fide
occupational qualification. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also In-
ternational Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (deciding whether gen-
der was a bona fide occupational qualification where job involved exposure to lead,
and could cause potential infertility problems).
152. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 650.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
154. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991). The specific language of § 2000e-
2(a)(1) provides: "[It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer] to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin." Id.
155. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1991). This provision provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established
under this title only if:
i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demon-
23
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characteristics were "a motivating factor for any employment
practice."156
Courts have stated the essential purpose of Title VII to be
the eradication of discrimination by employers against employ-
ees in the workplace. 157 Other asserted purposes include
achieving equal employment opportunities and, significantly,
making victims of discrimination whole. 58 The aim is a remedy
for wrongs done to the individual, but public policy is also
served by Title VII when discrimination is removed from the
work environment. 5 9
Title VII has traditionally provided only equitable remedies
for its victims. 60 The statutory remedies available include in-
junctive relief, affirmative action, reinstatement, back pay, "or
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."' 61
Historically, compensatory and punitive damages have not been
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity ...
Id.
156. Id. § 2000e-2(m). "Except as otherwise provided in [Title VIII, an unlaw-
ful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
157. See, e.g., Silver v. KCA Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978); Martin v.
Delaware Law Sch. of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1298-99 (D. Del. 1985),
affd, 884 F.2d 1384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989).
158. Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876 (11th Cir. 1986).
159. Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Note, however, that Title
VII was amended in 1991 to provide for legal remedies as well. See infra notes
244-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1991 amendments.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The text of the statute
reads:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such un-
lawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, em-
ployment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for
the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/6
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available. 162 Further, unlike tort plaintiffs, jury trials were also
not available for Title VII plaintiffs.163
Although damages under certain of the other federal anti-
discrimination statutes have been found to be excludable, 164 the
same treatment has not always been accorded to Title VII plain-
tiffs. There have been conflicting holdings in different Circuit
Courts of Appeal and in the Tax Court on the issue of whether
Title VII damages should be excludable.
In Metzger v. Commissioner,6 5 a college professor who was
denied tenure 66 confronted her employer with a barrage of
charges in both state and federal courts, beginning with a
charge of breach of contract in the state court. 6 7 In federal
court, she asserted violations of the Equal Pay Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII. 68 She eventually set-
162. See, e.g., Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 263 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding compensatory damages are available under § 1981, but not under
Title VII); Robinson v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 685 F. Supp. 233, 234-35
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding there can be no compensatory or punitive damages under
Title VII). Note again, however, that Title VII was amended in 1991 to provide for
compensatory and punitive damages. See infra notes 244-55 and accompanying
text.
163. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (stating that although the
Court would not pass on the issue, the courts of appeals had instructively held that
jury trials were not required in actions for reinstatement and back pay under Title
VII). The statement that jury trials are not available for Title VII plaintiffs was
made in dicta, as the Court was deciding the issue of jury trials for Title VIII plain-
tiffs. Id.
164. See supra notes 39-57, 66-77, 86-130, 140-52 and accompanying text.
165. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), affd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
166. Tenure is a system whereby a teaching institution's faculty members are
appointed, such that their employment will continue until retirement, barring any
unusual circumstances, such as gross incompetence. Id. at 836.
167. Id. at 838-40. Metzger claimed she was denied tenure and concurrently
dismissed in violation of the rules provided in the faculty handbook of the school,
which required that notice of non-reappointment be given at least twelve months
prior to the expiration of the professor's current term of employment. Id. at 836-
37. Metzger was notified, by a letter dated February 28, 1972, that her employ-
ment would terminate with the expiration of her contract on August 31, 1972. Id.
at 837. Metzger's breach of contract claim was based on the wages she lost from
the time of her termination, at age 43, until retirement, and the loss of tuition
grants for her two children. Id. at 838. She also claimed an inability to mitigate
her damages because there was no need for a professor with her qualifications in
the field of Spanish instruction in the area in which she was living. Id. Metzger
also brought a claim with the state Human Relations Commission, alleging dis-
crimination in her workplace on the basis of sex and national origin. Id. at 839.
168. Id. at 840. Metzger also claimed damages resulting from violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986, and Executive Order 11246 as amended by Executive
25
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tled all causes of action with her employer for $75,000.169 The
settlement provided that one-half of the amount represented
her wage claims, and one-half was in satisfaction of all other
claims. 170 Metzger then attempted to exclude from her income
one-half of the settlement, or $37,500.171 The Commissioner as-
serted that the entire $75,000 was includable in income. 72
The Tax Court disagreed. 173 As in Bent v. Commissioner,174
the court concluded that any amount in settlement of a § 1983
claim was excludable because such claims are for personal in-
jury, and are of a tort-type nature. 175 For the same reasons, the
court found any § 1981 recovery to be excludable. 176 The court
then evaluated Metzger's Title VII claim and found that while
the potential relief may be different, the injuries that Metzger
complained of under Title VII were essentially the same inju-
ries she complained of under § 1981.177 Because all of Metzger's
Order 11375. Id. The relief sought in conjunction with the federal claims was: 1)
declaratory relief, stating that the college had violated these federal statutory pro-
visions; 2) an injunction against the college to prevent further discrimination; 3)
her reappointment; 4) back pay; 5) $300,000 in punitive damages; 6) reasonable
attorney's fees and costs. Id. at 841. She also sought relief for her pendent state
claims: 1) her reappointment; 2) back pay; 3) $300,000 in punitive damages. Id.
169. Id. at 845.
170. Id. at 842.
171. Id. at 845.
172. Id. at 846.
173. Id.
174. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d. Cir. 1987). See supra notes 46-
50 and accompanying text.
175. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 851. The court found the ultimate holding in Bent
analogous (that gross income does not include amounts received from § 1983 ac-
tions), although Bent involved a First Amendment right to free speech, and Metz-
ger involved claims of racial and sexual discrimination. Id.
176. Id. at 852-53. The court stated:
[Section 1983 derives from the Fourteenth Amendment] which recognizes
the "equal status of every person;" that all persons shall be accorded the full
privileges of citizenship; and that no person should be deprived of life, lib-
erty or property "without due process." As the Court said, "[a] violation of
that command is an injury to the individual rights of the person." Those
concepts apply equally to actions under section 1981.
Metzger, 88 T.C. at 852-53 (citations omitted) (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 777 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1985), (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277
(1985), affid, 482 U.S. 656 (1987))).
177. Id. at 856. The court stated:
[M]uch of what is prohibited under the one statute is prohibited under the
other. Accordingly, although the relief sought under one statute may in
some cases be different from the relief sought under the other statute, the
1068
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federal causes of action were tort-type actions, the court found
that at least $37,500 of the settlement, the amount for which
Metzger sought exclusion, was entitled to the benefit of the sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion. 78
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also found Title VII
damages to be excludable in Burke v. United States.179 Plain-
tiffs, female employees of the Tennessee Valley Authority (the
"Authority"), including Therese Burke, brought suit 18 0 under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the Author-
ity maintained pay rate schedules that discriminated unfairly
on the basis of sex. 18 The discrimination suit was subsequently
settled. 8 2 The Authority agreed to distribute the recovery to
the plaintiffs, provided that it could withhold federal income
and social security (FICA) taxes. 8 3
The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee for refunds of the
federal income and social security taxes withheld from the re-
covery. 8 4 The federal district court found that the plaintiffs'
original claim was for a recovery in the nature of back pay re-
lief, and was not for personal injuries. 8 5 Therefore, the court
injuries complained of are often essentially the same.... [We conclude that
the injuries for which [Metzger] sought relief under [Title VIII . . . are as
much personal injuries as those for which [she] sought relief in the [§ 1981,
§ 1983, etc.] proceeding[s].
Id.
178. Id. at 858. The court noted that since Metzger had not sought to exclude
any greater amount, it did not have to determine whether any greater amount
would be excludable. Id.; see Burke & Friel, supra note 13, at 32.
179. 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
180. The original suit was entitled Hutcheson v. Dean (Civ. Action No. 3-85-
119 (E.D. Tenn.)). Hutcheson was eventually settled, and the plaintiffs, with the
exception of Hutcheson, brought suit in federal district court, seeking refunds of
the amounts withheld by the Authority for federal income tax. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at
1869.
181. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1869. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought an
injunction, as well as back pay for all affected female employees. Id.
182. Id. The settlement agreement provided for $4,200 to go to Plaintiff
Hutcheson, and $5,000,000 to go to the rest of the plaintiffs. Id. The $5,000,000
was to be divided among them based on pay rates and length of service. Id.
183. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1120. Taxes were withheld from all plaintiffs' recov-
eries, except 1) Hutcheson's $4,200 lump-sum recovery; 2) "monies left over as un-
deliverable to named individuals, which were turned over to the union;" and 3) the
left over monies that were later redistributed by the union to other employees. Id.
184. United States v. Burke, 90-1 U.S.T.C. 83,744.
185. Id. at 83,749.
27
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determined that the recovery should have been included in the
plaintiffs' incomes. 186 The court did recognize, however, that
pursuant to Metzger, a situation could arise where a Title VII
recovery would be excluded from gross income consideration be-
cause the damages awarded or settled upon were not for the
purpose of providing back pay. 8 7 However, that was not the
situation in Burke. 88
The Sixth Circuit reversed, relying on the test for exclud-
ability under section 104(a)(2) that had been first enunciated in
Threlkeld v. Commissioner.89 This test states that the only cri-
terion for a recovery to be excludable, is that it be obtained as a
result of a personal injury. 90 Whether or not the injury is per-
sonal is based on the origin and character of the claim, not the
results of the injury.191
The Burke court then looked to existing case law to support
the proposition that Title VII actions are actions for personal
injury, and are tort-like in nature. Thus, the court found sec-
tion 104(a)(2) to be applicable and the award excludable from
the plaintiffs' gross income. 192 The court rejected the Commis-
186. Id. The court supported its conclusion with language from the complaint,
which stated a desire to remedy past wage deficiencies, and certain provisions in
the settlement agreement, namely: 1) that the settlement should be allocated on
the basis of rates of pay and length of service, and 2) that the employer was to
withhold any relevant federal income and social security taxes from the distribu-
tions of the settlement to the plaintiffs. Id.
187. Id. at 83,748.
188. Id. at 83,749.
189. Burke v. Unites States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Threl-
keld, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)).
190. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299. As stated in Threlkeld:
[W]hether the damages received are paid on account of 'personal injuries'
should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry. To determine whether
the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the origin and charac-
ter of the claim and not to the consequences that result from the injury.
Id. (citations omitted). "Exclusion under section 104 will be appropriate if compen-
satory damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights that an indi-
vidual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law." Id. at 1308.
191. Id. at 1299.
192. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123. The court relied on Pistillo v. Commissioner,
912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that damages recovered in an age
discrimination suit under the ADEA were excludable, because they were compen-
sation for personal injuries. Id. The Burke court then stated that the Commis-
sioner had not sustained the burden of proving that damages recovered for age
discrimination were distinguishable from damages recovered for sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123.
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sioner's theory that Title VII damages were different from dam-
ages recovered for other forms of discrimination, 193 focusing
instead on the fact that Title VII actions are used for the pur-
pose of resolving personal injuries. 194 The court also rejected
the government's contention that allowing the exclusion would
put the plaintiffs in a better position than they would have been
in had they not been subjected to discrimination. 95 Relying on
Pistillo v. Commissioner,196 the court decided that because the
plaintiffs had suffered a dignitary tort, they should be entitled
to the same preferential tax treatment with respect to their
damages as any other tort plaintiff. 197 By focusing explicitly on
The court also said that the Commissioner had not sustained the burden of
proving why the injuries received because of sex discrimination were distinguish-
able from injuries received because of other non-physical, but tortious conduct that
was entitled to § 104(a)(2) excludability. Id. In support of this proposition, the
court cited: Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308 (injuries to taxpayer's professional reputa-
tion due to a malicious prosecution excludable as personal under § 104(a)(2)); Roe-
mer [v. Commissioner], 716 F.2d [693] at 700 [(9th Cir. 1983)] (compensatory
damages received in a taxpayer's defamation suit were excludable as personal in-
juries under § 104(a)(2)); Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 1989)
(relying on Bent [v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987)] and Roemer to ex-
tend the applicability of the § 104 exclusion to a retaliatory discharge claim under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and a wrongful discharge claim under state law). Id.
193. The Commissioner distinguished actions based on Title VII from other
discrimination actions because Title VII only provided for backpay as a remedy,
disallowing either compensatory or punitive damages as a form of relief, both of
which are intended "to make the plaintiff economically whole." Id. at 1122. The
significance of only allowing backpay as a form of relief, according to the Commis-
sioner's argument, is that since "back pay damages simply compensate plaintiffs
for income they would have received absent the discrimination, these awards are
economic rather than 'tort or tort-type' damages and therefore not excludable
under § 104." Id.
194. Id. at 1122-23. The court relied to a great extent, in making this deter-
mination, on Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990), where the
Sixth Circuit found that a claim made under the ADEA constituted a claim for
personal injuries, even if the claim involved an attempt to recover lost wages. Id.
at 1122. See supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text for a more detailed discus-
sion of Pistillo. The court also relied on Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d
Cir. 1990), another age discrimination case, in which the entire amount of the set-
tlement was held excludable under § 104(a)(2), despite the fact that some of the
compensation provided for in the agreement represented back pay. Burke, 929
F.2d at 1122-23; see supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Rickel.
195. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123.
196. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 99-113 and accompanying
text.
197. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123. The court stated:
29
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the existence or absence of a tort, the court deemed it unneces-
sary to distinguish between the age discrimination in Pistillo
and the sex discrimination in Burke, or to consider the differing
federal statutes under which these cases were brought.198
The lone dissenter distinguished Pistillo, however, stating
that the cases from which Pistillo derived its holding were
"clearly distinguishable" from the factual situation in Burke. 99
The dissent also criticized the majority's use of the Threlkeld
test, finding instead that Threlkeld held that a personal injury
aspect to a case does not indicate that the case is entirely about
personal injury.200 In such a case, the entire recovery may not
be excludable from gross income. 20' Instead, the dissent found
that Threlkeld requires courts to look to factors such as plead-
ings, evidence, and any written settlement agreement to deter-
mine if the case completely pertains to personal injury.20 2
The dissent in Burke also distinguished Metzger v. Commis-
sioner.203 The dissent noted that the desire of the plaintiffs in
Burke, unlike the plaintiff in Metzger, was to obtain back pay.20 4
The plaintiffs in Burke had made appropriate allegations in
Pistillo did suffer invidious age discrimination. Pistillo endured his employ-
ers' indignities, insults and age discrimination; suffered a dignitary tort;
and was personally injured.... Pistillo is now entitled to receive federal tax
treatment equal to that received by the typical tort victim who suffers physi-
cal injury and, as a result, receives a settlement award.
Id. (quoting Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 150).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1124 (Wellford, Senior Circuit J., dissenting). Judge Wellford
noted that Pistillo relied on Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989)
(involving a termination in violation of the First Amendment); Bent v. Commis-
sioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (involving primarily a First Amendment claim
and only partially a lost wages claim); Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th
Cir. 1983) (dealing with defamation damages). Id. Judge Wellford described these
cases as "clearly distinguishable" from Burke, a sex discrimination case. Id. He
found it significant that Wulf and Bent involved "wrongful terminations based
upon free speech considerations," while Burke involved "no termination and a
straightforward wage differential demand." Id. (emphasis in original). He thought
Roemer inapplicable simply because it involved defamation and not sex discrimi-
nation. Id.
200. Id. at 1125.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; Metzger, 88 T.C. 834, affd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra
notes 165-78 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of Metzger.
204. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1126 (Wellford, Senior Circuit J., dissenting).
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their complaint seeking back pay.20 5 Metzger, on the other
hand, had sought declaratory relief stating that her employer
had violated the applicable anti-discrimination statutes, an in-
junction to prevent further discrimination, reappointment, back
pay, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. 20 6
Finally, the dissenting judge looked to Thompson v. Com-
missioner.20 7 He relied on the analysis of Thompson, where the
plaintiff, like the plaintiffs in Burke, asserted a tort-type claim
for personal injuries, but was really prosecuting a claim for
back pay, "for earned, but unpaid, wages."20 8 Judge Wellford
stated that Title VII plaintiffs are unlike tort plaintiffs in that
tort plaintiffs do not assert claims for earned wages, but rather
assert claims for wages that they will not be able to earn as a
result of the tortfeasor's action. 209
Although the Third and Fourth Circuits have allowed Title
VII plaintiffs to exclude the amount of their recoveries from
gross income, other courts have not shown the same deference.
In Hodge v. Commissioner,210 the plaintiffs, a class of truck driv-
ers, originally brought suit against their employer claiming a
violation of Title VII, because they believed they were denied
promotions on the basis of race.21' Notably, there was no claim
of personal injury, and there was no request in the complaint
for personal injury damages. 212 The parties settled the ac-
tion,213 basing the settlement amount on the wage differential
between their present jobs and the jobs for which they were de-
nied promotion. 21 4
205. Id. at 1126 n.3.
206. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 841.
207. 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 140-52 and accompanying
text for a complete discussion of Thompson.
208. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1125 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
209. Id.
210. 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
211. Id. at 617. Plaintiffs alleged that they did not get transfers to better,
long distance routes from their current positions on city routes, because of racial
considerations. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 618. The District Court had granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs' employer in the discrimination suit. Id. at 617. However, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals 'reversed and remanded for the determination of three
issues, one of which was the amount of back pay to which the plaintiffs were enti-





Hodge, one of the class members, sought to exclude from
gross income one-half of the amount of his settlement, based on
section 104(a)(2), alleging that this portion represented compen-
sation for personal injuries. 215 He argued that the purpose of
Title VII was to secure recovery for the injuries resulting from
job discrimination, including, "psychic, mental, and emotional
damage."216 Even though all or a portion of the recovery may be
designated as back pay, Hodge argued that this designation was
unimportant, because the true purpose of Title VII was to as-
sure a remedy for the personal injuries resulting from discrimi-
nation. 217 The Commissioner argued that the entire settlement
amount should be included in income because it represented
wages. 21 8
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, and held
that back pay recoverable under Title VII is taxable in the year
in which the wages are, or were due.219 The court reasoned:
[h]ad there been no discrimination against the petitioner, he
would have received a better job without a lawsuit and would
have paid more taxes on increased pay as received.... Use of the
adjective "back" in the phrase "back pay" indicates a recovery of
wages which should have been paid but were not.220
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, however, the court relied on
the lack of a request for personal injury damages in the com-
plaint,221 and on the formula used to determine the amount of
the recovery, as it was based exclusively on the differential be-
215. Id. at 618-19. Hodge's actual contention was that the entire amount
should have been excludable as a recovery for personal injury damages, or in the
alternative, that at least one half represented personal injury damages. Id. at 620.
216. Id. at 618.
217. Id. at 618-19.
218. Id. at 620.
219. Id. at 619. "We find no support for petitioner's contention that all or a
portion of a recovery under [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which is
designated back pay is, in reality, a recovery for personal injury damages." Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 620. It should be noted however, that the court does not address
the issue of whether, if the amounts received by Hodge and the other class mem-
bers were characterized as personal injury damages, rather than back pay, the
amounts would then be excludable from gross income under § 104(a)(2). Id. at 619
n.7. The court stated:
[hiad personal injury damages constituted a part of the judgment, we are
confident that [Hodge] would have done far more than he did to assure him-
self of success in any dispute with the respondent over excluding his recov-
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tween the pay the plaintiffs should have received, and the pay
they actually received. 222
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with Hodge in Sparrow v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.223
The plaintiff in Sparrow was a computer specialist employed by
the Department of the Navy until he was given a notice of re-
moval that forced him to resign his position. 224 He then filed a
complaint against the Navy under Title VII, alleging racial dis-
crimination. 225 The case was eventually settled, and the Navy
paid Sparrow in three installments in the years 1982 through
1984.226 Sparrow did not report any of these amounts in his
gross income since he believed they were excludable under sec-
tion 104(a)(2). 227 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for
the years in question.228
The Tax Court found that the nature of the payments that
Sparrow received was "compensation" for back pay and for the
differential in salary between what he received, and what he
would have received, absent any discrimination. 229 The Tax
Court based its findings on the language and legislative history
of Title VII. It found that because Title VII only authorized eq-
uitable remedies, the payments could not be considered dam-
ages, such that they would get the benefit of the section
104(a)(2) exclusion. 230  The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed.23 '
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by stating that "dam-
ages," as the term is generally accepted, including for section
104(a)(2) purposes, is a remedy at law, not equity.232 The court
ery. Specifically, the final settlement should have contained an allocation
between back pay and damages, not a single lump sum.
Id. at 621.
222. Id. at 620.
223. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992).
224. Id. at 434.
225. Id. at 434-35.
226. Id. at 435.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 436.
230. Id. at 436-37.
231. Id. at 441.
232. Id. at 437. The court cited a long line of cases indicating this general
acceptance of damages as a remedy at law, and not equity, including: Freiderich-
1994] 1075
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then analyzed whether an award of back pay under Title VII
could be considered damages for section 104(a)(2) purposes. 233
The court found that the award of back pay could not be consid-
ered damages, and must be included in income. 234
In reaching this decision, the court utilized several factors.
First, the court looked at the language of Title VII, specifically,
the capacity of the court to impose any equitable remedy it
deems appropriate. 235 Next, the court noted that every circuit
that has addressed the issue has found that Title VII disallowed
the legal remedies of compensatory and punitive damages, and
limited relief only to equitable remedies. 236 The court also noted
the Supreme Court's differing treatment of legal and equitable
remedies. 237 Therefore, the court utilized both the intent of
sen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207, 208 (1918) (holding that damages, a remedy at law,
was available, although equitable relief was not); Javierre v. Central Altagracia,
217 U.S. 502, 508 (1910) (holding that where damages, a remedy at law, was avail-
able, an injunction, equitable relief, was inappropriate); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 196 (1974) ("[A]ctual and punitive damages.., is the traditional form of
relief offered in the courts of law."). The court also noted that plaintiffs seeking
legal remedies have the Seventh Amendment Constitutional right to a jury trial.
Id. at 198; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof.,
174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891).
233. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 437.
234. Id. at 438.
235. The relevant language of Title VII that the court recited stated:
the Court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
Id. at 437 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1991)).
236. Id. at 437-38 (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d
148, 159 (1st Cir. 1990); Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581
(2d Cir. 1989); Mitchell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 883 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1989);
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1020 (1989); Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 955 (4th Cir.
1987); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 972 (1986); Patzer v. Board of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 854 n.2 (7th Cir.
1985); Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989, 992 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984);
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical
Ctr., 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981); Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d
1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976)).
237. Id. at 438. "[N~ot all awards of monetary relief are properly character-
ized as the 'legal relief traditionally awarded in courts of law." Id. (citing Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)). Further, "[b]ecause the available remedies are
equitable, a Title VII plaintiff has no right to a jury trial." Id. (citing Robinson v.
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Congress in enacting Title VII, 238 and extensive case law, which
stated that back pay awards, including those under Title VII,
are taxable.239
The court in Sparrow also countered the rationale of the
Sixth Circuit in Burke v. United States, by stating that Burke
was "irreconcilable with Title VII precedent," and a misinter-
pretation of Threlkeld.240 The court found that the Sixth Circuit
looked only at the Threlkeld personal injury test,241 and com-
pletely ignored the requirement of section 104(a)(2) that the re-
covery be one for damages. 242
The difference in the holdings of the circuits and the Tax
Court did not mark the end of the inquiry for recipients of dam-
ages in Title VII actions. There have been two events subse-
quent to the decisions in these cases that may eventually yield a
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)).
238. Id. at 440. "The remedies available under Title VII exist to make whole
the employee discriminated against, that is, to place him in the same position he
would have been in but for the discrimination, but not to compensate beyond that."
Id. The court cited the Congressional Record for further support as to the purpose
of Title VII:
the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole,
and ... the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination
of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of ... but also
requires that the persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the
unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position
where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id. at 441 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972)). The Sparrow court went on to state
that "t]he taxing of a back pay award is consistent with the purpose of Title VII
because it places the employee who has been discriminated against in the same
position as if he had not been discriminated against, no more and no less." Id.
239. Id. at 438 (citing Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir.
1989) (back pay, as distinguished from liquidated damages portion of award, in-
cludable in gross income); Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d
1565, 1579-80 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) ("damages that
constitute a back pay award under Title VII are not exempt under § 104(a)(2)");
Coats v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 1642 (1977); Hodge v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 616 (1975); Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 749 F.2d 1451 (10th
Cir. 1984) (trial court properly included tax component in Title VII award)).
240. Id. at 439; Burke, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991); Threlkeld, 87 T.C. 1294,
afid, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
241. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 439; see supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
242. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 439. The court stated that the Sixth Circuit's ac-
tion in labeling a back pay award as damages was inappropriate, and reiterated
the position that not all awards of monetary relief constitute damages, especially
those awards that are for back pay pursuant to Title VII. Id.
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uniform result with respect to the excludability of Title VII re-
coveries. The first is the 1991 Amendment to Title VII, dis-
cussed below. The second is the decision of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Burke,243 discussed at length in part III.
F. Title VII, as Amended
Title VII was amended in 1991.244 Among other things,
Congress found that "additional remedies under Federal law
are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional dis-
crimination in the workplace."245 Title VII was amended by the
addition of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.246 Section 1981a provides that if
an aggrieved party brings an action under Title VII for unlawful
and intentional discrimination in the workplace, he or she can
recover compensatory and punitive damages in addition to the
equitable remedies provided by the unamended Title VII.247
However, to recover compensatory and punitive damages under
amended Title VII, the complaining party must first be unable
to obtain a recovery under § 1981.248
Compensatory damages under amended Title VII are
awarded exclusive of any back pay recoverable under the en-
forcement provisions of unamended Title VII.249 Punitive dam-
ages are recoverable if "the complaining party demonstrates
that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or dis-
criminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."250
There is, however, a statutory maximum of $300,000 in total
243. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
244. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, tit. I, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991)).
245. Id. § 2(1). The stated purposes of the amendment included, "to respond
to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimina-
tion." Id. § 3(4).
246. Id. § 102.
247. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
248. Id.; see supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
purposes of enactment, and requirements to obtain relief under § 1981.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (Supp. III 1991). This section specifically pro-
vides: "Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include
backpay [sic], interest on backpay [sic], or any other type of relief authorized
under" Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Id.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
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compensatory and punitive damages that can be awarded under
amended Title VII.25 '
The final amendment of significance for Title VII plaintiffs
(and defendants) is the provision that permits jury trials.252 If a
plaintiff seeks compensatory or punitive damages under
§ 1981a, any party may demand a jury trial.253
It remains to be seen whether the additional provisions of
Title VII will be retroactively applied to cases that were pend-
ing at the time that the amendments were enacted. The
Supreme Court has recently heard arguments in an effort to re-
solve the issue. 254 Cases heard in both the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have held that the provisions should not
be applied retroactively. 255
III. United States v. Burke
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve an inter-
circuit conflict,256 and in a five person majority decision, held
that damages received in settlement of a Title VII action are not
properly excludable from gross income based on section
104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.257
251. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991). The cap is graduated, depend-
ing on the number of people the respondent employs. Id. Employers with 15
through 100 employees are limited to $50,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). Employers
with 101 through 200 employees are limited to $100,000. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(B).
Employers with 201 through 500 employees are limited to $200,000. Id.
§ 1981a(b)(3)(C). Employers with 501 or more employees are limited to $300,000.
Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).
252. Id. § 1981a(c).
253. Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
254. Linda Greenhouse, Ginsburg at Fore in Court's Give-and-Take, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at Al, B8.
255. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 968 F.2d 427, 433 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993) (holding that retroactive application of the compen-
satory and punitive damage provisions of Title VII amendments would cause
"manifest injustice"); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490, 496-97 (6th
Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993) (finding that the legislative history
of the Title VII amendments, as well as a policy against retroactive application of
new legislation indicate that retroactive application of the new Title VII provisions
would "adversely affect substantive rights and liabilities").
256. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 & n.3 (1992); see supra
notes 1-7 and accompanying text.




The district court in Burke found that the plaintiffs had
originally made a claim for back pay, not for personal injuries,
and that the amount recovered in settlement was therefore not
excludable under section 104(a)(2).258 The Sixth Circuit re-
versed.259 The Sixth Circuit relied on the Threlkeld personal in-
jury test, and came to the ultimate conclusion that the injuries
suffered by Title VII plaintiffs were equivalent to personal inju-
ries, warranting exclusion under section 104(a)(2). 260 Although
the holding in Burke261 was in unison with the holding in Metz-
ger v. Commissioner,262 it was in conflict with the holdings of
both the Tax Court in Hodge v. Commissioner,263 and the D.C.
Circuit in Sparrow v. Commissioner.26 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting holdings. 265
B. Majority Holding
The majority agreed with the Sixth Circuit's focus on the
nature of the claim underlying the damage award received by
plaintiffs.266 The majority then analyzed whether a Title VII ac-
tion addressed a tort-like personal injury by focusing on the
remedies that are available to Title VII plaintiffs, as compared
to the remedies that are available to traditional tort plain-
tiffs.267 The Court noted that unlike tort plaintiffs, Title VII
plaintiffs are not entitled to either compensatory or punitive
258. Id. at 1869; see supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of the district court's disposition of the Burke plaintiffs' claims.
259. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123-24.
260. Id.; see supra notes 189-209 and accompanying text.
261. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123-24.
262. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), affd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra notes
165-78 and accompanying text.
263. 64 T.C. 616 (1975). See supra notes 210-22 and accompanying text.
264. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992); see
supra notes 223-42 and accompanying text.
265. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870 and n.3.
266. Id. at 1872. "The fact that employment discrimination causes harm to
individuals does not automatically imply.., that there exists a tort-like 'personal
injury' for purposes of federal income tax law." Id. at 1873.
267. Id. at 1872-73. The Court stated: "[T]he concept of a 'tort' is inextricably
bound up with remedies .... Thus, we believe that consideration of the remedies
available under Title VII is critical in determining the 'nature of the statute' and
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damages. 268 Although the case was decided in 1992, the Court
was forced to analyze the case pursuant to Title VII as it read
prior to the 1991 amendments because the case was originally
brought in 1990.269 Plaintiffs who sue under Title VII, as it ex-
isted prior to its amendment, are limited in their recovery to
back pay, injunctions, and other equitable relief27 ° To bolster
its analysis, the Court also noted that unlike tort plaintiffs,
plaintiffs in a Title VII action are not entitled to jury trials.271
The Court focused on the "remedial scheme" of Title VII
and its purpose of restoring the victims to the positions they
would have occupied absent the discrimination. 272 The reme-
dial scheme of pre-amendment Title VII made no provision for
compensating the plaintiffs with any of the remedies tradition-
ally available to victims of personal injuries, such as damages
for emotional distress or pain and suffering.27 3 Comparing the
taxability of relief granted under other federal anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was
268. Id. at 1873.
269. Id. at 1874 n.12.
270. Id. at 1873. Title VII, prior to its amendment, provided:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such un-
lawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1991).
271. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872. The majority cited Johnson v. Georgia High-
way Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969), and Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 192-93 (1974), to support its assertion.
272. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873. In describing the potential relief available
under Title VII prior to its amendment, the Court stated:
[a]n employee wrongfully discharged on the basis of sex thus may recover
only an amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned from
the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe
benefits such as vacation pay and pension benefits; similarly, an employee
wrongfully denied a promotion on the basis of sex... may recover only the
differential between the appropriate pay and actual pay for services per-
formed, as well as lost benefits.
Id.
273. Id.; see supra note 20.
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futile in the Court's opinion, because these statutes contained
different remedial schemes than Title VII.274
The plaintiffs in Burke argued that the 1991 amendments
to Title VII, which allow jury trials and recovery of both com-
pensatory and punitive damages, indicate that Congress did, in
fact, intend for Title VII to address personal injuries that are
tort-type in nature.275 Although the Court acknowledged these
changes, it ultimately rejected plaintiffs' argument, as these
changes "signal[ed] a marked change in [Congress's] conception
of the injury redressable by Title VII, and [could not] be im-
ported back into analysis of the statute as it existed at the time
of [the] lawsuit."276 The Court thus reached the ultimate con-
clusion that damages received in settlement of a Title VII suit
274. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.11. The Court noted that Title VII's remedial
scheme was modeled on the back pay provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, and that recoveries under the Act could constitute "wages" for purposes of the
social security tax, pursuant to Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946). Id.
at 1874 n.10. For an overview of remedies available under § 1983, see supra notes
32-38 and accompanying text. For an overview of remedies available under § 1981,
see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
275. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.12.
276. Id. The Court, therefore, did not address the issue of whether future Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs suing under the statute, as amended in 1991, would be able to
exclude from gross income the amount of their recovery. See supra notes 254-55
and accompanying text.
In Lieb v. Commissioner, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1846 (1992), the Tax Court relied
on Burke in deciding whether to grant summary judgment to a taxpayer who
wished to exclude a settlement received in a sex discrimination action. The court
denied the taxpayer's motion, pursuant to Burke, because there was a factual issue
as to whether any part of the taxpayer's settlement constituted a claim for back
pay under Title VII. Id. at 1847. That part would be includable in the taxpayer's
gross income. Id. The acts of discrimination at issue in Lieb arose in 1986 how-
ever, prior to the effective date of the amended Title VII. Id. at 1846.
Similarly, in Johnson-Waters v. Commissioner, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1693
(1993), the Tax Court held that at least part of the taxpayer's settlement was at-
tributable to a Title VII recovery, and therefore includable in income pursuant to
Burke. Id. at 1695. The taxpayer in her original action had alleged a violation of
Title VII and sought to recover the compensation she would have received had she
not been denied the promotion to which she was entitled. Id. at 1694. However,
her attorney, in a letter to the taxpayer's former employer, attempted to allocate
no portion of the settlement to back pay. Id. The Tax Court dismissed this alloca-
tion as a "self-serving statement on behalf of [taxpayer] to mitigate [her] Federal
tax liabilities . . . ." Id. Note that this case was also brought prior to the amend-
ments to Title VII.
Although these cases have been decided since Burke, they both involved
claims occurring prior to the 1991 amendments. However, the amendments, and
consequently the holding of Burke, may be applied retroactively depending on the
1082
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are not excludable under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.277
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but faulted the rea-
soning of the majority, and focused instead on an issue that was
not raised by either party during the course of the proceed-
ings.278 He stated that the plaintiffs' recovery should not be ex-
cludable from gross income because the IRS's long standing
interpretation of "personal injury" as analogous to a tort or tort-
type injury is incorrect. 279 Justice Scalia stated that "personal
injuries," instead of encompassing tort-type violations, should
be read more narrowly to encompass only physical injuries. 280
To support his analysis, Justice Scalia utilized the maxim
of statutory interpretation, "noscitur a sociis,"28 1 which would
outcome of cases currently pending in the Supreme Court. See supra notes 254-55
and accompanying text.
277. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874. This holding reversed the Sixth Circuit's hold-
ing in Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), and also may have
impliedly overruled Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987), af/d, 845 F.2d
1013 (3d Cir. 1988). However, Metzger was a more complex case because the plain-
tiff sought relief under several anti-discrimination statutes, and the tort and con-
tract portions of her settlement were not specifically allocated to any particular
anti-discrimination claim or claims. See supra notes 165-78 and accompanying
text for a more complete discussion of Metzger.
278. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1877 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia acknowl-
edged that his focus was uncharacteristic of traditional judiciary etiquette. Id.
However, he felt that:
there must be enough play in the joints that the Supreme Court need not
render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is appar-
ent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it particu-
larly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in the
system.
Id.
279. Id. at 1875.
280. Id. at 1875-76. "[I]ts more common connotation embraces only physical
injuries to the person (as when the consequences of an auto accident are divided
into 'personal injuries' and 'property damage'), or perhaps, in addition, injuries to a
person's mental health." Id. at 1875 (footnote omitted).
281. Id. (emphasis added). The term has been defined: "[i]t is known from its
associates." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990). "[Wlhile not an ines-
capable rule, [the maxim] is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Con-
gress." Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
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require "personal injuries" to be read in conjunction with "sick-
ness," as it is written in the statute.282 He pointed to the early
interpretation of section 213(b)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code
for support, wherein the definition of personal injuries was lim-
ited to physical injuries only. 28 3
For additional support of his proposition, Justice Scalia
noted that, in other contexts within section 104(a), the term
"'personal injuries or sickness"' is used to refer only to injuries
to a person's physical or mental health.28 4 Scalia also noted
that section 104(a)(2), as a tax exemption, is subject to the cus-
tomary rule of a narrow construction (for example, if the IRS
did not specifically exclude the item from gross income consider-
ation, it should be included). 28 5 Based on his interpretation of
"personal injuries" and the default rule of narrow construction
for tax exemptions, Scalia concluded that the plaintiffs' settle-
ment payment was not subject to the section 104(a)(2)
exclusion.28 6
D. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter also concurred in the result of the Court's
decision. 28 7 While he noted that Title VII actions had definite
282. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia then
noted that the dictionary definition of "sickness" denoted only "a '[d]iseased condi-
tion; illness; [or] ill health.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 2329-30 (2d ed. 1950)).
283. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 1876. Scalia points to:
[1] § 104(a)(1) (gross income does not include "amounts received under
workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sick-
ness" (emphasis added)); [2] § 104(a)(3) (gross income does not include
"amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal inju-
ries or sickness" (emphasis added)); [3] § 104(a)(4) (gross income does not
include "amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for
personal injuries or sickness resulting from active service in the armed
forces ... or as a disability annuity payable under ... the Foreign Service
Act").
Id. (emphasis added). Scalia reasoned that § 104(a)(2), read in the context of
these other provisions of § 104(a), clearly indicated that § 104(a)(2) was only
meant to apply to physical injuries. Id.
285. Id. There is support for this proposition in case law. See, e.g., United
States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512, 1519 (1991); Commissioner
v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
286. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1876.
287. Id. at 1877 (Souter, J., concurring).
1084 [Vol. 13:1043
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/6
UNITED STATES v. BURKE
similarity to dignitary tort actions,288 he also observed notable
similarities to contract actions. 289 Justice Souter stated that
the back pay provisions of Title VII resembled a contract mea-
sure of damages. 290 He also noted the similarity of the require-
ments of the Title VII provisions to provisions that customarily
arise in an employment contract.291
Justice Souter, however, thought it unnecessary to decide
which argument was stronger, that is, whether Title VII recov-
eries were more in the nature of tort or contract.292 Instead, he
utilized the default rule also stated by Justice Scalia, that since
exclusions from income are to be narrowly construed in the ab-
sence of a contrary, express provision in the Internal Revenue
Code, the recoveries Under Title VII should be included.293
E. Dissent Holding
The dissenters, Justices O'Connor and Thomas, disagreed
with the majority's focus on remedies as being determinative of
the type of injury suffered by plaintiffs. 294 The dissenters felt
that the best measure of whether an injury is a "tort-type" in-
jury is to focus on the nature of the statute and the type of claim
that is brought under the auspices of the statute.295 As applied
to Title VII, they argued that the nature of that statute is to
provide protection from a tort injury because it awards "com-
288. Id. "There are definite parallels between, say, a defamation action,
which vindicates the plaintiffs interest in [his] good name, and a Title VII suit,
which arguably vindicates an interest in dignity as a human being entitled to be
judged on individual merit." Id. Justice Souter also cited cases decided under fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to support
the theory that there are parallels between tort actions and actions based on fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes. Id. (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 277-
78 (1985) (§ 1983); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987)
(§ 1981)).
289. Id. at 1877-78.
290. Id. at 1877. "Back pay.., is quintessentially a contractual measure of
damages" and limitation of recovery to back pay "counts against holding [plain-
tiffs'] statutory action to be 'tort-type.'" Id.
291. Id. at 1877-78. In fact, Justice Souter stated that the Title VII provisions
could be considered implied terms in every employment contract. Id. at 1878.
292. Id.
293. Id. This proposition finds support from the holdings of other Supreme
Court cases. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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pensation for invasions of a [person's] right to be free from cer-
tain injury in the workplace."296 Title VII also provides a public
policy incentive to employers to keep their workplaces free from
the potential effects of such injuries.297
The dissent then compared Title VII to other anti-discrimi-
nation statutes such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
to demonstrate their tort-type nature, as they are principally
intended to combat the invasion of personal rights. 298 Once
again, if plaintiffs can establish that the damages received were
in settlement of a tort-type claim for personal injuries, the dam-
ages will be excludable under section 104(a)(2). 299
The dissent also disagreed with the majority on three other
issues. First, with respect to the majority's assertion that the
non-taxability of the recovery would be a windfall to plaintiffs,
the dissent noted that the non-taxability of the recovery would
merely put Title VII plaintiffs on an equal footing with any
other tort plaintiff who had suffered a personal injury.30 0 The
plaintiffs should therefore be permitted to exclude from gross
income the amount of their recovery. 301 Second, the dissent
failed to see any connection between whether an injury was
tort-like and whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.30 2
296. Id. The dissent stated that Title VII "fundamentally differs from con-
tract liability," which is intended to ensure that people perform their promises. Id.
It also distinguished quasi-contractual liability, which is designed to prevent un-
just enrichment. Id. Title VII is instead designed to "compensate employees for
injury they suffer and to 'eradicat[e] discrimination throughout the economy.'" Id.
(quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)).
297. Id. at 1879). "It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award
that 'provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to elimi-
nate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of [discrimination].'" Id. (quoting Al-
bermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)).
298. Id. at 1879-80. In conducting its analysis, the dissent relied on Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (finding that the closest state law equivalent to a
§ 1983 action was a tort claim for personal injuries); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656 (1987) (finding that the closest state law equivalent to a § 1981 action
was an action based on personal injuries). Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
299. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1993).
300. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1880 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Id. The dissent stated that the Court had never expressly ruled on the
issue of whether Title VII plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial. Id. Further, the
dissent criticized the majority for placing any emphasis at all on the issue of
whether plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, as that issue seemed to have no
relevance to § 104(a)(2) excludability. Id. The dissent, however, in interpreting
1086
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Finally, the dissent noted the broadening effect of Title VII, as
evidenced by the 1991 amendments. 30 3 This lent support to the
argument that the purpose of Title VII was not to give plaintiffs
a contractual remedy to recover back pay, but rather, to counter
the negative effects of discrimination in the workplace. 30 4
IV. The Effect of United States v. Burke and the 1991
Amendments to Title VII on the Excludability of
Title VII Recoveries
United States v. Burke held that Title VII recoveries were
not properly excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.30 5 In reaching this con-
clusion, the majority focused primarily on the remedial scheme
of Title VII.30 6 However, the 1991 amendments to Title VII re-
sulted in drastic changes to the remedial scheme, as they per-
mit the traditional tort remedies of compensatory and punitive
damages. 30 7 Therefore, while Burke may have drastic effects on
recipients of Title VII damages prior to the amendments the ef-
fects may not be as drastic for recipients after the amendments,
or for claimants whose cases were pending at the time of the
amendments. 308
the reasoning of the majority, assumed that the majority raised the issue of jury
trials as a means of demonstrating that Title VII claims are equitable rather than
legal in nature. Id. Based on this reasoning, the dissent again criticized the ma-
jority because the IRS's definition of "damages," as the prosecution or settlement of
a legal suit based on tort or tort-type rights, makes no distinction between actions
at law and suits in equity. Id. at 1880-81.
303. Id. at 1881.
304. Id. The dissent argued that even before the 1991 amendments, Title VII
reached more than just economic aspects of discrimination. Id. Title VII has al-
ways attempted to counter the severe psychological and emotional effects that dis-
crimination in the workplace might have. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986)). Therefore, in enacting the 1991 amendments, Congress
was acknowledging that additional, tougher remedies were needed to "effectuate
... [Title VII's] settled purposes." Id.
305. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
306. Id. at 1872-73.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
308. Although it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will give Ti-
tle VII retroactive effect, it would seem to be unlikely as no circuit court of appeal
that has heard the issue has given Title VII retroactive effect. See supra notes
254-55 and accompanying text. In addition, there is a policy against retroactive
application of new legislation. See supra note 255. However, all references in this
analysis to Title VII claimants after the effective date of the 1991 amendments
45
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A. Title VII Recoveries and Settlements Prior to 1991
Amendments
The decision in United States v. Burke resolved the inter-
circuit conflict and held that recoveries in Title VII actions must
be included in income.30 9 Although the majority did not address
recoveries after the effective date of the 1991 amendments, 310
its holding regarding recoveries and settlements prior to the
1991 amendments was unequivocal. 311 This holding impliedly
overrules Metzger v. Commissioner.312 In Metzger, the court de-
termined that the injuries that the plaintiff claimed under Title
VII were as much personal injuries as those claimed under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. 3 13 Therefore, the court held that at least the one
half of the recovery that the plaintiff sought to exclude, was
properly excludable. 314
However, Metzger was a "hybrid" Title VII case in that the
plaintiff claimed injuries under other federal anti-discrimina-
tion statutes in addition to Title VII, and was somewhat unu-
sual in that the plaintiff only sought to exclude half of her
recovery.315 The court in Metzger might have been faced with a
completely different issue had Metzger attempted to exclude
her entire settlement. In such a case, the court would be forced
to decide what, if any, portion of the settlement represented the
Title VII claims, which would be includable under Burke. The
court would then have to decide what portion of the settlement
represented recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims or 42
U.S.C. § 1981 claims. This portion would be excludable under
section 104(a)(2) pursuant to Bent v. Commissioner316 and Wulf
shall also include Title VII claimants whose cases were pending at the date of en-
actment of the new legislation, should the Supreme Court decide to give Title VII
retroactive effect.
309. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
310. Id. at 1874 n.12.
311. Id.
312. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), affd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra notes
165-78 and accompanying text for discussion of Metzger.
313. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 856.
314. Id. at 858.
315. Id. at 841-42.
316. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that recov-
eries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 represent personal injury recoveries that are permis-
sibly excluded under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). Id. at 249.
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v. Commissioner.317 However, this situation did not arise in
Metzger because the plaintiff had conceded that one half of the
recovery was includable, as it represented wage claims.318
In future situations where a claimant has recovered or set-
tled a Title VII action which was brought in conjunction with
other federal anti-discrimination sections prior to the 1991
amendments to Title VII, the court will enjoy a certain amount
of discretion in deciding whether the payments are excludable.
Pursuant to Burke, the recovery is includable to the extent that
it represents payment for, or settlement of, Title VII claims.319
Multiple claims will require additional fact finding. However,
ultimate allocation of the recovery by the court between Title
VII violations and other violations may be somewhat arbitrary.
The requirement of includability of Title VII recoveries could
also be overcome through clever draftsmanship of the settle-
ment agreement, allocating nothing to Title VII, and everything
to § 1983 or § 1981, despite the nature of the actual violation.
In sum, Burke laid down a bright-line rule with respect to
recoveries that are exclusively for Title VII claims brought prior
to the 1991 amendments. 320 However, the rule is not as clear if
multiple claims are brought under the auspices of several fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes. Excludability is still appro-
priate for recoveries and settlements under § 1983,321 § 1981,322
the ADEA,323 and portions of recoveries under the Equal Pay
Act.3 24 The question becomes what part of an unallocated recov-
317. 883 F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that even back pay recoveries
under § 1983 are excludable from gross income treatment).
318. Metzger, 88 T.C. at 842.
319. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874.
320. Id.
321. See Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 249 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d
Cir. 1987); supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
322. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Johnson-Waters
v. Commissioner, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1693 (1993) in conjunction with Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986); Wulf v.
City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 39-57, 66-77 and
accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990); see supra
notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
324. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632, 632 (1987), affd, 866 F.2d
709 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the liquidated damages portion, but not the back
pay portion of recovery under the Equal Pay Act is excludable under § 104(a)(2));




ery is attributable to Title VII, and what part is attributable to
another statute.
B. Title VII Recoveries and Settlements After the 1991
Amendments
1. Title VII as Compared to Other Federal Anti-
Discrimination Statutes
The majority's holding in Burke was limited to Title VII as
it existed prior to the 1991 amendments. 325 The majority inter-
preted these amendments as signalling a "marked change in
[Congress's] conception of the injury redressable by Title VII
.... "326 The dissent, however, viewed the amendments as Con-
gress's method of effectuating the purposes of Title VII.327 In
any event, the change in the nature of the remedies available
suggests that if the same factual situation as Burke were again
decided by the Supreme Court, applying the amended version of
Title VII, the vote would be seven to two in favor of excludabil-
ity, rather than seven to two in favor of includability. 328
Title VII was unique among the federal anti-discrimination
statutes because its remedial scheme was limited to only equi-
table remedies.329 Such is no longer the case. Since there is
now provision for both compensatory and punitive damages,330
Title VII more closely resembles the remedial schemes of
§ 1983, § 1981, and the ADEA, all of which allow for legal as
325. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.12.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
328. In reaching its holding, the majority analyzed the remedial scheme of
Title VII, and determined that since it did not allow damages as a traditional tort
remedy, but merely equitable relief, a Title VII claim was not a claim that would
be excludable under § 104(a)(2). Id. at 1872-73. Title VII now permits both com-
pensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991). If the
determination turns on remedies, the five members of the majority would presum-
ably join the two members of the dissent, who stated that Title VII recoveries
should be excludable on other grounds. Justices Scalia and Souter, who concurred
in the result, would now constitute dissenters, since neither would allow exclud-
ability in the absence of clear guidance from the I.R.S. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1876
(Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 1878 (Souter, J., concurring).
329. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III 1991); see supra notes 160-63 and ac-
companying text.
330. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
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well as equitable relief,33' and all of which permit the entire re-
covery to be excludable, regardless of a back pay component. 332
a. Title VII as Compared to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 was enacted to provide a federal remedy for
the protection of the Constitutional guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 33 3 Therefore, it protects against the depri-
vation of rights, privileges, or immunities, under color of state
law.334 Deprivation of rights occurs in a case of discrimination,
and is therefore actionable under § 1983.335 Like Title VII,
§ 1983 acts as a protection against discrimination. Like the
amended Title VII, its remedial structure is broad, allowing for
the recovery of equitable as well as legal remedies. 336 Claims
brought under § 1983 are recognized to be claims for personal
injury, pursuant to Wilson v. Garcia.337 Therefore, recoveries
have been held to be excludable from gross income. 33
Title VII and § 1983 share a mutual purpose of protection
against discrimination. Further, the 1991 amendments to Title
VII have made its remedial scheme more closely analogous to
that of § 1983. Therefore, because § 1983 recoveries are exclud-
able from gross income, it would be consistent to find Title VII
recoveries excludable. Failure to do so would grant tax benefits
to those who had suffered sex discrimination under color of
state law, but not to those who have suffered sex discrimination
331. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text with respect to the reme-
dial scheme of § 1983; supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text with respect to
the remedial scheme of § 1981; supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text with re-
spect to the remedial scheme of the ADEA.
332. See Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 249 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d
Cir. 1987) (holding § 1983 damages excludable); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482
U.S. 656, 669 (1987) (finding that § 1981 injuries are personal injuries); Rickel v.
Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 656 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding back pay and liquidated
damages recovered under ADEA are excludable because they are compensation for
personal injuries); Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990)
(same).
333. Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); see supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
334. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
335. See, e.g. Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 851-52 (1987), affd, 845
F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
336. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
337. 471 U.S. 261 (1985); see supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
338. Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 249 (1986), affld, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.




in a private workplace. This would be true regardless of the
equivalency of harm resulting from the discrimination. Even if
the discrimination in the private workplace was more pur-
poseful and harmful, discrimination under color of state law
would still get preferential tax treatment.
b. Title VII as Compared to 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Among the protections afforded by § 1981 is the right of all
persons, regardless of race, "to make and enforce contracts."339
It's protection extends to the workplace. 340 Although § 1981
protects contractual rights, it is more "in the nature of a tort
remedy."341 Its remedies are therefore not limited merely to the
equitable, but can also include compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.342 According to Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,343 the char-
acterization of § 1981 claims is similar to that of claims under
§ 1983. 344 Pursuant to Wilson v. Garcia,345 these claims would
therefore be characterized as claims for personal injuries, which
are excludable under section 104(a)(2). 346 In addition, in John-
son-Waters v. Commissioner,347 the Tax Court seemed to con-
cede that § 1981 provided a remedy for injuries to tort-type
rights, which recoveries are properly excludable under section
104(a)(2). 348
Title VII also protects contractual rights by allowing claim-
ants to recover wages that have been earned, but not yet
paid.349 Title VII, as amended, provides further protection by
allowing compensatory and punitive damages,35 0 arguably pro-
viding a further means of deterrence to keep employers from
339. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991); see supra notes 57-62 and accompa-
nying text.
340. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
341. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986),
affd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
342. Collier v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 441 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (E.D. Pa.
1977); see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
343. 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
344. Id. at 661.
345. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
346. Id. at 276.
347. 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1693 (1993).
348. Id. at 1695 n.2; see supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
349. See, e.g., Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975).
350. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
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discriminating in the workplace. Because Title VII and § 1981
provide similar protections of a person's right to contract, the
act of discrimination under Title VII should be considered as
much a personal injury as it is under § 1981, thereby justifying
section 104(a)(2) exclusion. It would be inconsistent to tax the
recovery gained from the protection afforded against discrimi-
nation in the context of Title VII, but not in the context of
§ 1981. Therefore, to the extent § 1981 recoveries, which in-
clude recoveries for back pay, are excludable, so too should Title
VII recoveries be excludable.
c. Title VII as Compared to the ADEA
Under the ADEA, Congress intended to prohibit age dis-
crimination in employment. 351 The ADEA was enacted because
Title VII did not extend to age discrimination. 352 Unlike Title
VII prior to its amendment, however, the ADEA allows for a
recovery of more than just back pay; it also allows for a recovery
of liquidated damages equal to the amount of the back pay if the
violation of the ADEA was willful.353 Recoveries under the
ADEA have been found by more than one Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to constitute a recovery for personal injury that is exclud-
able under section 104(a)(2), regardless of whether any part of
the recovery constitutes back pay.354 Although Title VII is in-
tended to prohibit sex discrimination in the workplace, and the
ADEA is intended to prohibit age discrimination in the work-
place, they are aimed at the same essential goal-the preven-
tion of discrimination. The amendments to Title VII parallel
the ADEA. There is now a provision for the legal remedy of pu-
nitive damages, which is similar to the ADEA's provision for liq-
uidated damages that Congress intended to be punitive in
nature. 355
The Tax Court has had the opportunity to reevaluate its
position on back pay recoveries under the ADEA in light of the
351. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (Supp. III 1991); see supra notes 78-83 and accompa-
nying text.
352. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
353. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Supp. III 1991).
354. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v.
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990).




Supreme Court's holding in Burke.356 Despite the similarity be-
tween the ADEA and Title VII, the Tax Court held, albeit not
unanimously, in Downey v. Commissioner (Downey II), that
back pay recoveries under the ADEA are properly excludable
from income. 357 Since recoveries, including back pay, are ex-
cludable under the ADEA, they should also be excludable under
Title VII, as amended.
d. Title VII as Compared to the Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act is the exception to the rule on exclud-
ability in federal anti-discrimination statutes, as demonstrated
by Thompson v. Commissioner.358 Pursuant to Thompson, the
back pay component of a recovery is includable in income, as it
is considered in the nature of a contract violation. 359 The part of
a recovery constituting liquidated damages, however, is
excludable. 360
The Equal Pay Act utilizes essentially the same remedial
scheme as the ADEA, allowing for the recovery of back pay, as
well as liquidated damages in an amount equivalent to the back
pay award. 361 Moreover, the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA
share common purposes: the Equal Pay Act is primarily aimed
at eliminating sex discrimination in the workplace, 362 and the
ADEA is aimed at eliminating age discrimination in the work-
place.363 Despite similar purposes, and despite the same reme-
dial schemes, Thompson, decided under the Equal Pay Act,
stands in contrast to both Rickel v. Commissioner364 and Pistillo
v. Commissioner.3 5 These cases provide that recoveries under
356. Downey v. Commissioner, 1992-93 T.C.M. (P-H) 336 (1993).
357. Id. at 338.
358. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), affd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
359. Id. at 646.
360. Id. at 650. Although measured by the amount of back pay due, the liqui-
dated damages portion is paid because the employer discriminated against his em-
ployees in bad faith. Id.
361. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. III 1991). Note, however, that the ADEA, un-
like the Equal Pay Act, contains a requirement of willful discrimination by the
employer in order to qualify for the liquidated damages award. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(Supp. III 1991).
362. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. III 1991).
363. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (Supp. III 1991).
364. 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
365. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
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this common remedial scheme are entirely excludable under
section 104(a)(2), regardless of any back pay component.
These three cases were decided by different Circuit Courts
of Appeals. 366 Therefore, the Third and Sixth Circuits in decid-
ing Rickel and Pistillo, were under no obligation to follow the
1989 Thompson decision. The Rickel and Pistillo decisions left
Thompson as somewhat of an aberration in the anti-discrimina-
tion remedial scheme provided by § 1983, § 1981, and the
ADEA. However, even if Thompson is not an aberration, it
would at least support the proposition that any compensatory or
punitive damages recovered under Title VII would compensate
for the personal injury of discrimination, rather than make up
for earned but unpaid wages, and would therefore be
excludable.
2. The Effect on the Taxation of Title VII Recoveries
Caused by Changes in Title VII's Remedial
Scheme
Comparing the similarities of Title VII to other federal
anti-discrimination statutes may be of some use in determining
the future for the excludability of Title VII recoveries. However,
the ultimate question still comes down to whether Title VII is
an action for personal injuries based on tort or tort-type rights,
such that it would justify exclusion of the recovery under sec-
tion 104(a)(2). In reaching the conclusion that Title VII was not
an action for personal injuries based on tort or tort-type rights,
the majority in Burke focused on the remedial scheme of Title
VII.367 The Court noted that Title VII as it existed at the time of
the suit, limited claimants to equitable remedies, including
back pay. 368 Awarding back pay to an employee is not a means
of punishing the employer; rather, it is a means of restoring the
claimant to the position he or she would have occupied absent
the discrimination. 369 In this sense, an award of back pay is
similar to a contract remedy. 370
366. Thompson, 4th Circuit; Rickel, 3d Circuit; Pistillo, 6th Circuit.
367. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872-73. See supra notes 266-77 and accompanying
text.
368. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873.
369. Id. See generally Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975).





However, there are other considerations in the remedial
scheme of Title VII, not considered by the Burke majority,
which would lend support to finding a Title VII claim more in
the nature of tort than contract. Beyond compensating plain-
tiffs, tort remedies also serve the purposes of "punish[ing]
wrongdoers and deter[ring] wrongful conduct."3 71 While this is
done through punitive damage awards, it can also be done
through equitable relief.372 For example, the issuance of a de-
claratory judgment, stating that a particular employer discrimi-
nates against women in the practice of hiring, may serve as a
deterrent. Declaratory judgments also serve a remedial pur-
pose unique to tort law, that of vindicating the plaintiffs
rights.373 Deterrence may also come through the potential for
back pay awards or injunctive relief, which effectively give dis-
criminatory practices the stamp of judicial disapproval.
The dissenting justices in Burke focused on the nature of
the claim, rather than on the remedial scheme available.374
Provisions for compensatory and punitive damages strongly in-
dicate that the nature of the claim sounds in tort. In the ab-
sence of such damage provisions, however, the court must
resort to other information in determining the nature of the
claim. For example, in assessing the primary purpose of Title
VII, to eliminate discrimination in the workplace by employers
against employees, 375 it becomes apparent that Title VII is more
closely related to the tort law purpose of deterring wrongful con-
duct than it is to the contract law purpose of protecting the
promisee. Additionally, the contention that Title VII is
grounded in tort is strengthened because the aim of Title VII
parallels tort law in attempting to make the victim whole.376
However, discussion of whether the appropriate method of
analysis is "remedial scheme" or "nature of the claim," has be-
come somewhat moot with respect to Title VII, in light of the
1991 amendments. The Burke dissent, using "nature of the
371. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979).
372. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873.
373. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(d) (1979).
374. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1879 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
375. See, e.g., Silver v. KCA Inc., 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra notes
157-59 and accompanying text.
376. Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876 (11th Cir. 1986); see
supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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claim" analysis, found Title VII to be an action to compensate
for personal injury in tort or tort-type claims.37 7 Conversely, the
majority applied a "remedial scheme" analysis, and determined
that based on Title VII's remedial scheme, it was not aimed at
protecting tort-type rights.3 7 8
The 1991 amendments to Title VII seem to counter the big-
gest obstacles that the majority found for disallowing the sec-
tion 104(a)(2) exclusion for Title VII recoveries. The majority
argued that the remedies provided by Title VII were not tradi-
tional tort remedies that would warrant the 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion.37 9 That distinction no longer exists, as compensatory and
punitive damages are both permitted under the amended Title
VII.380 The majority also noted that unlike traditional tort
plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs are not entitled to jury trials.3 81
That distinction also no longer exists, as any party can require a
jury trial in a Title VII action if compensatory or punitive dam-
ages are requested by the plaintiff.3 82
The Court also refused to compare Title VII to other federal
anti-discrimination statutes where exclusion of the recovery
was allowed, because of Title VII's differing remedial scheme,
which permitted only equitable relief.38 3 This difference has
also been abrogated by the amendments, since allowing both
legal and equitable relief has made Title VII more akin to other
federal anti-discrimination statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the ADEA. 'Whether Congress was re-
conceptualizing its interpretation of Title VII, or was enacting
stronger remedies to help effectuate established purposes is ir-
relevant. Under either scenario, Title VII recoveries-at least
recoveries for compensatory damages 384-should now qualify
for section 104(a)(2) exclusion under both the Burke majority's
377. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1878-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 1874.
379. Id. at 1873.
380. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
381. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872.
382. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
383. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874 n.11.
384. Note that although the capacity to recover punitive damages indicates
that the cause of action exists to protect tort-type rights, punitive damages do not
qualify for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of




"remedial scheme" analysis and the dissent's "nature of the
claim" analysis.
Although the arguments seem to support finding recoveries
under amended Title VII excludable from gross income for pur-
poses of calculating taxable income, arguments persist that
favor such recoveries remaining includable. The most persua-
sive argument is that Burke is the law. The Supreme Court did
not say that recovery under the old Title VII would be includ-
able and recovery under the amended Title VII would be exclud-
able. While the amendments to Title VII suggest that Title VII
recoveries will eventually be considered excludable, the result
in Burke has not been superseded by statute or overruled by the
Supreme Court. Therefore, lower courts may disregard the
holding of Burke, in light of the 1991 amendments, but they do
so without the benefit of affirmative guidance from the
Supreme Court. Some lower courts may not believe that the
amendments, standing alone, are a sufficient basis to rule con-
trary to Burke.
There is also an argument that while compensatory dam-
ages under Title VII may be excludable, any award of back pay
must still be included pursuant to Thompson v. Commis-
sioner.385 Under Thompson, the true nature of a contract claim
for back wages does not change because the claim also involves
a tort-type claim for personal injuries. 3 6 If the damages are re-
covered in lieu of wages, then that amount is not properly ex-
cludable under section 104(a)(2).387 This proposition also has
support in case law.388 For example, in Hodge v. Commis-
sioner,389 the Tax Court held that back pay recoverable under
Title VII is not properly excludable from gross income consider-
ation.390 Hodge also implied that if the plaintiff had classified
the recovery as personal injury damages, rather than as back
385. 89 T.C. 632, 648 (1987), affd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
386. Id. at 646.
387. Id. at 647.
388. See Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Title
VII back pay award is not properly excludable), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992);
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1580 (5th Cir. 1989)
(same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990); Coats v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H)
1642, 1644 (1977) (back pay is compensation and thereby included); Hodge v. Com-
missioner, 64 T.C. 616, 620 (1975) (same).
389. 64 T.C. 616 (1975).
390. Id. at 619.
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pay, the recovery would more likely have been excludable. 391
These cases support the proposition that Title VII recoveries
containing a back pay component may be includable in gross
income, to the extent that the recovery constitutes back pay.
However, as noted previously, many courts disregard the
existence of a back pay component when the claim evinces a
tort-like personal injury. 392 In fact, the Tax Court, even in light
of the Supreme Court's holding in Burke, has found that back
pay recoveries under the ADEA are excludable from income.393
Thus, the argument that back pay recoveries remain includable
in gross income, pursuant to Burke, may not be viable. This is
particularly true since the recent amendments have expanded
the nature of injury addressable by Title VII to encompass tort-
like personal injuries.394 Thus, recoveries under Title VII,
whether back pay or traditional tort recoveries, should now be
excludable from gross income.
C. An Alternative Theory for Deciding Excludability Under
the 1991 Amendments
In Burke, Justices Scalia and Souter concurred in the result
that the Title VII recovery was properly included in income for
reasons other than the tort/contract analysis utilized by the ma-
jority and the dissent.395 Both justices felt that Burke could
have been more simply, but still correctly decided by using a
default rule that statutory exclusions from income are to receive
a narrow construction. 396 There is support for this proposition
in case law.397 However, in Burke, there was not enough sup-
port among the justices to utilize the rule in deciding the case.
Thus, this theory of determination, while valid, will probably
391. Id. at 619-20 n.7.
392. See, e.g., Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989);
supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
393. Downey v. Commissioner, 1992-93 T.C. Rep. (RIA) 336 (1993).
394. See supra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
395. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1876 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1878 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
396. Id.
397. See, e.g., United States v. Centennial Say. Bank, FSB, 111 S. Ct. 1512,
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not play any significant role in the ultimate decision of whether
Title VII recoveries are excludable.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Burke,
that recoveries in a Title VII action are not properly excludable
from income, does not appear as though it will remain law for
very long. The 1991 amendments to Title VII lend strong sup-
port to the theory that Congress desires Title VII plaintiffs to be
treated as other tort plaintiffs, by providing them with provi-
sions for compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials.
Until the judiciary decides otherwise, however, Burke remains
the law, and requires that any recovery incident to a Title VII
action be included in the recipient's gross income.
Michael J. Minihan
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